Consolidation of the Cold War: Strategic Plans, 1947–48
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From the end of 1947 military thinking about Germany became more certain, albeit in a negative sense: there was now even less willingness to entertain a continental strategy. The basic budgetary, technological and doctrinal prejudices against military involvement on the Continent went largely unchallenged and were even given something of a boost during interventions by Attlee at the end of 1947. The Future Defence Policy paper (FDP — DO (47) 44), which provided the framework for strategic thinking during 1947 and beyond, implied further movement away from military involvement in Germany.2 From early 1948 Britain was involved in new planning discussions — most notably those with the Americans — which, again, postulated movement away from Germany both conceptually and physically.
KeywordsMiddle East Defence Policy Land Force Ally Force Military Involvement
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Notes and References
- 18.R. Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp.69ff.Google Scholar
- 20.S. Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, p.8; Hamilton, Monty, p.699; Kent and Young, ‘The ‘Western Union’ Concept and British Defence Policy, 1947–8’, in Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, pp.174–5.Google Scholar
- 42.K.W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. Volume II — 1947–1949 (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier Inc.,1979), pp.283–292. See also Krieger, ‘American Security Policy in Europe before NATO’, in Heller and Gillingham (eds.), NATO. For the text of HALFMOON see T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis, (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1978 ), pp. 315–323.Google Scholar