Political Regimes and Economic Growth

Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)


Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.


Political Economy Government Spending Comparative International Development Democratic Regime Authoritarian Regime 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Adelman, I. and Morris, C. (1967) Society, Politics and Economic Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).Google Scholar
  2. Alesina, A. and Rodrik, D. (1991) ‘Distributive Politics and Economic Growth’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 3668.Google Scholar
  3. Amemiya, T. (1985) Advanced Econometrics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).Google Scholar
  4. Amsden, A. H. (1989) Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
  5. Arat, F. (1988) ‘Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited’, Comparative Politics, vol. 21, no. 1 (October) pp. 21–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Bardhan, P. (1988) ‘Comment on Gustav Ranis’ and John C. H. Fei’s “Development Economics: What Next?”’, in Ranis, G. and Schultz, T. P. (eds), The State of Development Economics: Progress and Perspectives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) pp. 137–8.Google Scholar
  7. Bardhan, P. (1990) ‘Symposium on the State and Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 4, pp. 39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Barro, R. J. (1989) ‘A Cross-country Study of Growth, Saving, and Government’, NBER working paper no. 2855.Google Scholar
  9. Barro, R. J. (1990) ‘Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, pp. S103–S125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Barro, R. J. (1991) ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’, Quarterly Journal of Economics: October, pp. 407–43.Google Scholar
  11. Becker, G. S. (1983) ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August, pp. 371–400.Google Scholar
  12. Bollen, K. A. and Jackman, R. W. (1985) ‘Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s’, Research in Political Sociology, no. 1, pp. 27–48.Google Scholar
  13. Cheibub, J. A. (1992) ‘Measuring Tax Effort: A Preliminary Report’, University of Chicago, Department of Political Science.Google Scholar
  14. Collini, S., Winch, D. and Burrow, J. (1983) That Noble Science of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Crain, M. W. (1977) ‘On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85, pp. 829–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Cui, Z. (1992) ‘Incomplete Markets and Constitutional Democracy’, University of Chicago, (manuscript).Google Scholar
  17. Cutright, P. (1963) ‘National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis’, American Sociological Review, no. 28, pp. 253–64.Google Scholar
  18. Dick, W. G. (1974) ‘Authoritarian versus Non-authoritarian Approaches to Economic Development’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 82, pp. 817–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Dore, R. (1978) ‘Scholars and Preachers’, IDS Bulletin, June.Google Scholar
  20. Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row).Google Scholar
  21. Elster, J. (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
  22. Elster, J. (1989) Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
  23. Elster, J. and Moene, K. O. (1989) ‘Introduction’, Alternatives to Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 1–38.Google Scholar
  24. Evans, P. B. (1989) ‘Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State’, Sociological Forum no. 4, pp. 561–87.Google Scholar
  25. Fernandez, R. and Rodrick, D. (1991) ‘Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty’, American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 5 (December) pp. 146–55.Google Scholar
  26. Findlay, R. (1990) ‘The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for the LDCs’, Economics and Politics, vol. 2, pp. 193–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Galenson, W. (1959) ‘Introduction’ to Galenson, W. (ed.), Labor and Economic Development (New York: Wiley).Google Scholar
  28. Galenson, W. and Leibenstein, H. (1955) ‘Investment Criteria, Productivity and Economic Development’, Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 69, pp. 343–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Gereffi, G. and Wyman, D. L. (eds) (1990) Manufacturing Miracles. Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
  30. Greene, W. H. (1990) Econometric Analysis (New York: Macmillan).Google Scholar
  31. Grier, K. B. and Tullock, G. (1989) ‘An Empirical Analysis of Cross-national Economic Growth, 1951–80’, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 24, no. 2; pp. 259–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Haggard, S. (1990) Pathways From Periphery. The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).Google Scholar
  33. Hannan, M. T. and Carroll, G. R. (1981) ‘Dynamics of Formal Political Structure: An Event-History Analysis’, American Sociological Review, vol. 46, no. 1 (February) pp. 19–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Heckman, J. J. (1978) ‘Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System’, Econometrica, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 931–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Heckman, J. J. (1990) ‘Selection Bias and Self-selection’, in The New Palgrave. Econometrics, Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P. (eds) (New York: W. W. Norton).Google Scholar
  36. Helliwell, J. F. (1992) ‘Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth’, NBER working paper no. 4066 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Huntington, S. P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press).Google Scholar
  38. Huntington, S. P. and Dominguez, J. I. (1975) ‘Political Development’, in Greenstein, F. I. and Polsby, N. W. (eds), Handbook of Political Science vol. 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley).Google Scholar
  39. Kaldor, N. (1955-6) ‘Alternative Theories of Distribution’, Review of Economic Studies, no. 23, pp. 94–100.Google Scholar
  40. Kohli, A. (1986) ‘Democracy and Development’ in Lewis, J. P. and Kallab, V. (eds), Development Strategies Reconsidered (New Brunwick: Transaction Books).Google Scholar
  41. Kormendi, R. C. and Meguire, P. G. (1985) ‘Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth’, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 16, pp. 141–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Landau, D. (1986) ‘Government and Economic Growth in the Less Developed Countries: An Empirical Study for 1960–1980’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 35, pp. 35–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Lee, L. F. (1978) ‘Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables’, International Economic Review, vol. 19, pp. 415–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Levine, R. and Renelt, D. (1991) ‘A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-country Growth Regressions’, World Bank Working Paper, WPS 609.Google Scholar
  45. Lindauer, D. L. and Velenchik, A. D. (1992) ‘Government Spending in Developing Countries. Trends, Causes, and Consequences’, The World Bank Research Observer, no. 7, pp. 59–78.Google Scholar
  46. Lipset, S. M. (1960) Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday).Google Scholar
  47. Macaulay, T. B. (1900) Complete Writings 17 (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin) p. 263.Google Scholar
  48. Maddala, G. S. (1983) Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Marsh, R. M. (1979) ‘Does Democracy Hinder Economic Development in the Latecomer Developing Nations?’, Comparative Social Research, vol. 2, pp. 215–48.Google Scholar
  50. Marsh, R. M. (1988) ‘Sociological Explanations of Economic Growth’, Studies in Comparative International Research, vol. 13, pp. 41–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Marx, K. (1934) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress Publishers) p. 18.Google Scholar
  52. Marx, K. (1952) The Class Struggle in France, 1848 to 1850 (Moscow: Progress Publishers).Google Scholar
  53. Marx, K. (1971) Writings on the Paris Commune, Draper, H. (ed.) (New York: International Publishers) p. 198.Google Scholar
  54. Neubauer, D. E. (1967) ‘Some Conditions of Democracy’, American Political Science Review, vol. 61, pp. 1002–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. North, D. C. and Thomas, R. P. (1973) The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. North, D. C. and Weingast, B. R. (1989) ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 49, pp. 803–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. O’Donnell, G. (1973) Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California).Google Scholar
  59. O’Flaherty, B. (1990) ‘Why Are There Democracies? A Principal Agent Answer’, Economics and Politics, no. 2, pp. 133–55.Google Scholar
  60. Olson, M., Jr. (1963) ‘Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 23, pp. 529–52.Google Scholar
  61. Olson, M., Jr. (1991) ‘Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity’, in Zeckhauser, R. J. (ed.), Strategy and Choice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) pp. 131–57.Google Scholar
  62. Pasinetti, L. (1961–2) ‘Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 29, pp. 267–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1991) ‘Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence’, working paper no. 91, pp. 155, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
  64. Pourgerami, A. (1988) ‘The political Economy of Development: A Cross-national Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth Hypothesis’, Public Choice, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 123–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  65. Pourgerami, A. (1991) ‘The Political Economy of Development. An Empirical Investigation of the Wealth Theory of Democracy’, Journal of Theoretical Politics vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 189–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Przeworski, A. (1966) ‘Party Systems and Economic Development’, Northwestern University, Ph.D. Dissertation.Google Scholar
  67. Przeworski, A. (1990) ‘The State and the Economy under Capitalism’, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics, vol. 40 (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers).Google Scholar
  68. Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1992) ‘Selection, Counterfactuals and Comparisons’, University of Chicago, manuscript.Google Scholar
  69. Przeworski, A. and Wallerstein, M. (1988) ‘Structural Dependence of the State on Capital’, American Political Science Review vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 11–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Ram, R. (1986) ‘Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series Data’, American Economic Review, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 191–203Google Scholar
  71. Rao, V. (1984) ‘Democracry and Economic Development’, Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 67–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  72. Remmer, K. (1990) ‘Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience’, World Politics vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 315–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. Reynolds, L. G. (1983) ‘The Spread of Economic Growth to the Third World’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 941–80.Google Scholar
  74. Rodrik, D. (1992) ‘Political Economy and Development Policy’, European Economic Review, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 329–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  75. Romer, P. (1992) ‘Increasing Returns and New Developments in the Theory of Growth’, in Barnett, W. A. (ed.) Equilibrium Theory and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press) pp. 83–110.Google Scholar
  76. Sah, R. K. (1991) ‘Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 67–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  77. Schepsle, K. (1989) ‘Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 1, no. 2 (April) pp. 131–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  78. Schweinitz, K. de, Jr. (1959) ‘Industrialization, Labor Controls and Democracy’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 7, pp. 385–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  79. Schweinitz, K. de, Jr. (1964) Industrialization and Democracy (New York: Free Press).Google Scholar
  80. Scully, G. W. (1988) The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’, Journal of Political Economy vol. 96, pp. 652–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  81. Scully, G. W. (1992) Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  82. Sloan, J. and Tedin, K. L. (1987) ‘The Consequences of Regimes Type for Public-Policy Outputs’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 1 (April) pp. 98–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  83. Smith, A. K., Jr. (1969) ‘Socio-economic Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, no. 13, pp. 95–125.Google Scholar
  84. Soares, G. A. D. (1987) ‘Desenvolvimento Economico e Democracia en America Latina’ (Economic and Democratic Development in Latin America), Dados, no. 30, pp. 253–74.Google Scholar
  85. Stolzenberg, R. M. and Relies, D. A. (1990) ‘Theory Testing in a World of Constrained Research Design’, Sociological Methods and Research vol. 18, no. 4 (May) pp. 395–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  86. Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market, Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press).Google Scholar
  87. Weede, E. (1983) ‘The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth: Some Evidence from Cross-National Analysis’, Kyklos vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 21–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  88. Westphal, L. E. (1990) ‘Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from South Korea’s Experience’, Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 41–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  89. Wittman, D. (1989) ‘Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 97, no. 6, pp. 1395–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  90. World Bank (1987) World Development Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Economic Association 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ChicagoUSA
  2. 2.University of Sao PauloBrazil
  3. 3.IESABarcelonaSpain

Personalised recommendations