Abstract
From the mid-1950s to the end of the cold war, Britain’s ‘Atlanticist’ approach to Western European security revolved around three assumptions.1 The first was that the political and military involvement of the USA should be nurtured. Second, there was the acceptance of nuclear weapons in operational planning, for defence and deterrence. The final assumption was that the defence of Western Europe should be a matter for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Along with the USA, West Germany and other allies, Britain committed conventional troops and air forces to NATO’s European command, to be stationed permanently in Germany. Britain’s faith in the Atlanticist approach has been tenacious.2
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
The 1990 ‘Options for Change’ defence review, Britain’s reaction to the events of 1989 and the changing requirements of European security, revealed the strength of this conviction: L. Scott, ‘British perspectives on the future of European security’, in C. McInnes (ed.), Security and Strategy in the New Europe (London, 1992), p. 178.
D. Greenwood, ‘Defence and National Priorities Since 1945’, in J. Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London, 1977), p. 187.
R. B. Brett, 2nd Viscount Esher, chairman, War Office Reconstruction Committee 1903–4. Quoted in M. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972), p. 49.
S. Dockrill, ‘The Evolution of Britain’s Policy Towards a European Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1989), p. 57 (note 103).
H. A. DeWeerd, ‘Britain’s Changing Military Policy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1 (October 1955), p. 103.
C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509–1970 (London, 1970), p. 482.
J. Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949 (London, 1993), p. 128.
See F. A. Johnson, Defence by Ministry (London, 1980), ch. 2;
M. Edmonds, ‘The Higher Organisation of Defence in Britain’, in M. Edmonds (ed.), The Defence Equation — British Military Systems; Policy, Planning and Performance Since 1945 (London, 1986), ch. 4.
E. Broadbent, The Military and Government From Macmillan to Heseltine (London, 1988), p. 112.
L. Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (London, 1986), p. 4.
R. A. Bitzinger, Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945–1975 (Santa Monica, 1989), pp. 1–12.
PRO: DO (47) 44, May 1947, reproduced in J. Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London, 1988), appendix 7.
PRO: DO (50) 45, 7 June 1950; H. J. Yasamee and K. A. Hamilton, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Volume IV: Korea, June 1950-April 1951 [henceforth, DBPO] (London, 1991), pp. 411ff.
R. J. Aldrich and J. Zametica, ‘The rise and decline of a strategic concept: the Middle East, 1945–51’, in R. J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51, (London, 1992), pp. 264.
S. Dockrill has described Montgomery as ‘a lone voice in advocating in February 1948 that Britain should send two divisions to the Continent to encourage the morale of her European friends’: Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950–1955 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 8.
N. Hamilton sees these events and arguments in late January/early February 1948 as the beginning of ‘Monty’s struggle to make Western Union and the Atlantic Pact a military reality’: Monty: The Field-Marshal 1944–1976 (London, 1986), p. 699. Kent and Young have also described Montgomery as ‘the one British military figure who was genuinely interested in continental cooperation’, although they point out that he was wary of allowing his enthusiasm for Europe to lead him into making any promises of committing British troops to the Continent: ‘The “Western Union” concept and British defence policy, 1947–8’, in Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, pp. 174–5.
E. Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945–50 (London, 1983), p. 197.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1995 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Cornish, P. (1995). The British Military View of European Security, 1945–50. In: Deighton, A. (eds) Building Postwar Europe. S. Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24052-4_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24052-4_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-24054-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-24052-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)