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Public Choice Theory of Government Intervention

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Public Sector Economics

Part of the book series: Macmillan Texts in Economics ((TE))

Abstract

Previous chapters have examined the efficiency rationale for government intervention, namely where markets fail to achieve allocative efficiency, and the means by which such intervention is financed. The basic Keynesian model of the management of aggregate demand is an example of how, in theory, intervention can be used during times of mass unemployment in order to maximise the output of the economy, so moving the economy back onto its production possibility frontier. Crowding out reduces the efficacy of intervention but, if less than 100 per cent, increased output may lead to a welfare improvement (see Chapter 5). However the analysis of Pareto optimality demonstrated that detailed knowledge of both production conditions and consumption preferences is required if allocative efficiency is to be attained through non-market systems (see Chapter 2). Moreover ‘second best’ theory suggests that piecemeal intervention may be counter-productive, increasing rather than reducing allocative efficiency.

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Further reading

  • Bramley, G., Le Grand, J. and Low, W. (1989) ‘How Far is the Poll Tax a Community Charge? The Implications of Service Usage Evidence’, Policy and Politics, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 187–205.

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  • Le Grand, J. (1991) ‘The Theory of Government Failure’, SAUS Studies in Decentralisation and Quasi-markets, no. 5 (Bristol: School for Advanced Urban Studies).

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  • Le Grand, J. and Winter, D. (1987) ‘The Middle Classes and the Defence of the British Welfare State’, in Goodin, R., Le Grand, J. et al., Not Only the Poor: the Middle Classes and the Welfare State (London: Allen and Unwin).

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  • Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press).

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  • Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press).

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  • Pampel, F. C. and Williamson, J. B. (1989) Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

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  • Self, P. (1993) Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

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© 1995 Stephen J. Bailey

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Bailey, S.J. (1995). Public Choice Theory of Government Intervention. In: Public Sector Economics. Macmillan Texts in Economics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24004-3_7

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