Abstract
In the whole disaster-ridden first year of the Soviet Union’s war with Nazi Germany, no threat to the viability and survival of the Soviet state was so severe as the Moscow crisis in the middle of October 1941. Surprised by Hitler’s decision to launch Operation Typhoon in the late autumn and by the speed of the Wehrmacht’s advance on Moscow, the Soviet leadership was galvanised into the most drastic of actions by the German break-through of the capital’s main strategic defence, the Mozhaisk line, on the night of 14–15 October. The decision of the State Committee of Defence (GKO) on 15 October to order the immediate evacuation of most of the government to Kuibyshev and other cities far in the rear, and the preparation of factories, offices and warehouses for destruction, reflected its belief that the imminent capture of Moscow by the Germans was likely. The highly visible departure of members of the elite, combined with the sudden reduction or cessation of normal services, and the virtual disappearance of the police from public view, caused alarm among the public to turn to panic. Many people fled from the city, among them officials who abandoned their posts; while on the streets of Moscow, law and order broke down to an extent unparalleled in Soviet history before or after. The panic, however, subsided almost as quickly as it had arisen.
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Notes
See Michael Parrish, The USSR in World War II, An Annotated Bibliography of Books published in the USSR, 1945–75 (with an Appendix for the years 1975–80), 2 vols. (New York, 1981).
Leon Goure and Herbert Dinerstein, ‘Moscow in Crisis’, in Two Studies of Soviet Conflicts (Glencoe, Illinois, 1955), pp. 145–254.
Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–45 (New York, 1964);
see chapter X, pp. 225–42, ‘Battle of Moscow Begins — the October 16 Panic’. For an example of the author’s wartime writing from this period, see Alexander Werth, Moscow War Diary (New York, 1942).
See K.I. Bukov, ‘Trevozhnyi oktyabr’ 41-go’, Kentavr, Oct.-Dec. 1991, pp. 70–9; ‘Ne tol’ko panika (oktyabr’ 1941 g. v Moskve)’, in Neizvestnaya Rossiya. XX vek (hereafter NR), II1 (Moscow, 1993), pp. 177–96 (documents introduced and compiled by K. I. Bukov); ‘1–15 oktyabr’ 1941 g.’, in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1990, no. 12, pp. 203–18; ‘Moskva na osadnom polozhenii’, in Izvestiya TsK KPSS, 1991, no. 1, pp. 215–21; no. 2, pp. 209–21; no. 3, pp. 220–21; no. 4, pp. 209–21. Russian archives whose materials are used in this article include the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Scientific Archive of the Institute of History of Russia of the Russian Academy of Sciences (NAIIRRAN), the Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Modern History (RTsKhIDNI), the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), and the Centre for the Preservation of Modern Documents (TsKhSD).
For the military history of the battle of Moscow, see V. A. Anfilov, Krushenie pokhoda Gitlera na Moskvu. 1941 (Moscow, 1989);
Geoffrey Jukes, The Defence of Moscow (London, 1969);
Janus Piekalkiewicz, Moscow: 1941 — the Frozen Offensive (London, 1985);
Klaus Reinhardt, Moscow — the Turning Point: the Failure of Hitler’s Strategy in the Winter of 1941–42 (Oxford, 1992);
A. M. Samsonov, Moskva, 1941 god: ot tragedii porazhenii — k velikoi pobede (Moscow, 1991).
On the contrary, as John Armstrong argues, the distribution of people’s commissariats and other government agencies after evacuation suggests a well thought-out strategy for continuing to organise the war effort; John A.Armstrong, ‘The Relocation of the Soviet Commissariats in World War II’, in Karl-Heinz Manegold (ed.), Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Technik: Studien zur Geschichte (Munich, 1972) pp. 92–7.
Gabriel Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940–42 (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 251–2. Cripps, who that morning had told a correspondent that there was ‘no cause for undue alarm or despondency’, noted that Molotov had never looked ‘so tired and ill … he was deadly pale and his collar all awry where he is generally very neat and tidy.’
Daniil Granin, ‘Zapretnaya glava: rasskaz’, Znamya, 1988, no. 2, p. 122.
Arkadii Vaksberg, Neraskryt’e tainy (Moscow, 1993), pp. 61–5.
D. Ortenberg, Iyun’-dekabr’ sorok pervogo, rasskaz- khronika (M., 1986) p. 212.
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Barber, J. (1995). The Moscow Crisis of October 1941. In: Cooper, J., Perrie, M., Rees, E.A. (eds) Soviet History, 1917–53. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23939-9_9
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