Abstract
Wars of attrition are ubiquitous, spanning industrial disputes, instrumentalist economic sanctions episodes,1 oligopolistic price wars, animal conflicts, sundry sporting contests and the standard military examples. Nations and individuals enter wars of attrition hoping that conflict will become intolerable for their opponent before it does for them. Persistence is costly, but the persistent prevail.
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© 1994 Manas Chatterji, Henk Jager and Annemarie Rima
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Bonetti, S. (1994). The Persistence and Frequency of Economic Sanctions. In: Chatterji, M., Jager, H., Rima, A. (eds) The Economics of International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23695-4_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23695-4_17
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