Abstract
The purpose of assuming that political behaviour has simple and constant motivation was to build a universal theory of political behaviour — the sort of theory that might work if the pursuit of wealth were as unvarying as (say) the force of gravity.
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Notes
Gordon Tullock, ‘A (Partial) Rehabilitation of the Public Interest Theory’, Public Choice 42, 1, (1984) p. 89.
Dennis C. Mueller, ‘Rational Egoism versus Adaptive Egoism as Fundamental Postulates for a Descriptive Theory of Human Behaviour’, Public Choice 51, 1 (1986), pp. 3–23.
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© 1994 Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard
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Stretton, H., Orchard, L. (1994). Public Choice: Living with Failure. In: Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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