Abstract
Most public choice theory rests on four assumptions: (i) individual material self-interest sufficiently motivates most economic behaviour, which (ii) is sufficiently understood by the use of neoclassical economic theory; and since (iii) the same individual material self-interest sufficiently motivates most political behaviour, (iv) that also may be sufficiently understood by the use of the same neoclassical economic theory. We dispute all four assumptions but lest our account of them be thought unfair, here is how a wholly sympathetic surveyor of public choice theory introduces it:
Public choice can be defined as the economic study of non-market decisionmaking, or simply the application of economics to political science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voter behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however. The basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer.1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (1979) p. 1, and Public Choice II: A revised edition of Public Choice (1989) pp. 1–2.
Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, ‘Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the “Nobel” Lie’, Virginia Law Review 74, 1988, p. 180.
Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional political economy (1985) p. 51.
William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971).
Michael Pusey, Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes its Mind (1991).
Peter Self, ‘What’s Wrong with Government?’, The Political Quarterly 61, 1, 1990, p. 24.
Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft’, Western Economic Journal V, 3 1967, pp. 224–33.
J.M. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds) Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (1980) p. ix.
Robert D. Tollison, ‘Is The Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay?’, in Charles K. Rowley (ed.) Democracy and Public Choice: Essays In Honor of Gordon Tullock (1987) p. 155.
Douglass C. North, ‘Rent-Seeking and the New Institutional Economies’, in Charles K. Rowley (ed.) Democracy and Public Choice (1987) p. 163.
James M. Buchanan, ‘Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and its Normative Implications’, first published in 1979 and reprinted in James M. Buchanan and Robert Tollison, Theory of Public Choice 11, University of Michigan Press, 1984, p. 12.
Copyright information
© 1994 Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stretton, H., Orchard, L. (1994). Public Choice: The Attempt. In: Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-60725-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-23505-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)