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A Very Short History

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Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice

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Abstract

This short history indicates which theories are our subject, when and by whom they were introduced, and some relations between them.

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Notes

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Authors
  1. Hugh Stretton
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  2. Lionel Orchard
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© 1994 Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard

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Stretton, H., Orchard, L. (1994). A Very Short History. In: Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_2

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