Abstract
Western governments are supposed to contrive stable prices and full employment. They are supposed to restrain excessive inequalities of wealth and opportunity and see that everyone can achieve a basic standard of living. They currently wrestle with various effects of ageing population, and of women’s changing rights, opportunities and stresses. Their environmental management is improving but still has far to go. Technical changes and imprudent deregulation have brought some of their financial systems near to anarchy. All these problems call for better rather than less government. None of them is soluble by unaided market forces.
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Notes
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© 1994 Hugh Stretton and Lionel Orchard
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Stretton, H., Orchard, L. (1994). Motives. In: Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23505-6_1
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