Abstract
It was in winter 1970. Chancellor Brandt had taken office in Bonn and started initiatives seeking to overcome the previous confrontation between the two German states. Hopes of reunification had withered away. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was seen as an established fact which could not be changed. West German political scientists began to argue that the East Germans had accepted their leaders. So it was wise for the Federal Republic to accept the GDR in order to provide for a cooperative relationship. In this political atmosphere, a Protestant parish group which stood for promotion of understanding with East Germany, was travelling from Cologne to what was then Karl-Marx-Stadt. While on the train, the Protestant advocates of good relations with the GDR met a group of the official Communist youth organization. The two sides began talking. For fun rather than seriously, one of the West Germans raised the question: ‘Would you like reunification?’ The unanimous response was: ‘Of course, but only with Western conditions!’ The reply was felt to be both shocking and absurd — but it was prophetic in indicating what the East Germans successfully pressed for 20 years later.
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Notes
From an East German perspective see Günter Schabowski, Der Absturz (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991), p. 211;
Jens Kaiser, ‘Zwischen angestrebter Eigenständigkeit und traditioneller Unterordnung’, Deutschland Archiv, 5 (1991) pp. 478–9, 483–7. On the basis of sources then available in the West: Gerhard Wettig, The Present Soviet View on Trends in Germany’, in: Harry Gelman (ed.), The Future of Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe, R–3254– FF/NATO (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, September 1985) pp. 77–90.
Kaiser, ‘Zwischen angestrebter Eigenständigkeit’, p. 490; Eduard Schewardnadse, Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1991) pp. 210–11; Valerii Musatov, ‘Vostochnaia Evropa: “Taifun” peremen’, Pravda, 13 Mar. 1991.
This applied, in particular, to Sputnik and Neue Zeit. For more details see Lev Bezymenskii, ‘Nado li opasat’sja za GDR?’ Novoe vremia, 50 (1989) p. 13.
Markus Wolf, In eigenem Auftrag (Munich: Schneekluth, 1991) pp. 147–8. For underlying convictions see pp. 37–40, 60–1, 142–7, 148–53.
Statement made by an anonymous Stasi officer, Die Welt, 8 Jun. 1990; Cordt Schnibben, ‘Ich bin das Volk’, Der Spiegel, 16 (1990) p. 75.
Leonid Tsedilin, ‘Torgovat’ tsivilizovanno — znachit vzaimovygodno’, Kommunist, 9 (1990) pp. 118–19.
V. Aleksandrov [consultant of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee], ‘ Vneshniaia politika — algoritmy perekhoda’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 5 (1991) p. 21.
J. Maksimychev and P. Men’shikov [Soviet diplomats in East Berlin], ‘Edinoe germanskoe gosudarstvo?’ Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 6 (1990) p. 45. Similarly: Ambassador Kochemasov in an interview in Tribüne, 8 May 1990; Schewardnadse, Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit, pp. 210–11.
Interview with E. Shevardnadze in Der Spiegel, 22 (1991) p. 166.
Gyula Horn, Freiheit, die ich meine (Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1991) p. 318.
See particularly M.S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany i dlia vsego mira (Moscow: Izd. pol. lit., 1987) p. 209.
Uwe Thaysen, Der Runde Tisch oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990) p. 165.
Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991) p. 33.
See Krenz’s quotation from his personal notes (Osteuropa, 4 (1992) pp. 368–9; Hans Modrow, Aufbruch und Ende, 2nd edn (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1991) pp. 25–6.
Manfred Schell and Werner Kalinka, ‘Wie Krenz zum Verlierer wurde’, Die Welt, 25 May 1990. Largely identical reports which, however, differ in a few details are provided by Peter Siebenmorgen, ‘Vom Retter zum Sündenbock’, Die Zeit, 3 May 1991; interview with an anonymous Stasi officer, Die Welt, 25 May 1990. A characteristic Soviet evaluation of Modrow’s takeover is contained in Anatolii Kovrigin, ‘Dinamika peremen’, Novoe vremia, 47 (1989) pp. 5–6. Novoe vremia was read by Shevardnadze on a regular basis.
At this point, the Kremlin obviously took it for granted that Bonn’s insistence on the goal of unification was more rhetorical than real. Cf. the assessment contained in Nikita Zholkver, ‘Kogda rukhnula stena …’, Novoe vremia, 48 (1989) pp. 24–5.
Among Soviet experts, however, there was increasing awareness in late autumn 1989 that German unification might prove inescapable at last, if only gradually and slowly. Cf. Mikhail Bezrukov and Mikhail Kozhokin, ‘Germanskii vopros’, Novoe vremia, 51 (1989) pp. 12–14.
J. Maksimychev, ‘Germaniia i my’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 8 (1991) p. 71.
See Jens Reich, Abschied von den Lebenslügen. Die Intelligenz und die Macht (Berlin: Rowohlt Verlag, 1992).
For this traditional Soviet policy pattern see Gerhard Wettig, High Road, Low Road: Diplomacy and Public Action in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989).
This view has been subsequently elaborated in full by K. Pleshakov, ‘Nashi natsional’nye interesy v perekhodnyi period’, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 11 (1991) pp. 15–25.
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Wettig, G. (1994). The Kremlin’s Impact on the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany (August 1989–March 1990). In: Westad, O.A., Holtsmark, S., Neumann, I.B. (eds) The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–89. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23234-5_9
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