Calculation and Miscalculation in Baghdad

Abstract

Behind the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait lies Saddam Hussein’s conviction that many if not most Iraqis believe that Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq, separated from it by British imperialism. This notion started to find public expression in the 1930s, and never died out. Another ideological influence was hostility, prevalent in the Iraqi media during the Iran-Iraq war and following the cease-fire, towards the rich Arab States and their peoples; the Ba’ath regime missed no opportunity to accuse the Gulf states of gross ingratitude, refusing to give Iraq financial support after the Iraqis spilled ‘rivers of blood’ in their defence against Iran. A more general influence was an atmosphere of extreme local-Iraqi chauvinism in a pan-Arab guise. For twenty years Saddam and his regime endeavoured to convince their countrymen that Iraq was burdened with the historical mission of leading the way towards the unification and renaissance of all the Arabs. Thus, they argued, every-thing that helped Iraq, by definition, helped the Arab nation. Likewise, they argued, he who hurts Iraq necessarily hurts the Arab nation as a whole.¹

Neither blindness nor ignorance corrupts people and governments. They soon realize where the path they have taken is leading them. But there is an impulse within them, favoured by their natures and reinforced by their habits, which comes forward as long as they have a remnant of strength. He who overcomes himself is divine. Most see their ruin before their eyes, but they go on into it.

Leopold Von Ranke