The Radical Conceptualization of Perceptual Experience
Perceptual experience does not consist in a mere passive reception of sensations which come ready-marked with their identities and interrelationships. A child sees an animal, where we see a camel, and a biologist might see a dromedary. I see a Picasso, you see the work of someone obsessed with blue; I hear noise, you hear a composition by John Cage. Thus, the content of our perceptual experience is, surely to some extent, structured by the conceptual resources which we possess. But to what extent? In this chapter I will defend the view, which I will call the ‘conceptualist’ view, that the possession of concepts is a necessary condition of all perceptual experience.
KeywordsCage Rubber Smoke Defend Metaphor
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