Abstract
The economics of labour management and producer cooperatives began in earnest with Ward’s celebrated paper in 1958 (Ward, 1958). The Wardian theory of the labour-managed firm (LMF) was extended in the early contributions of Domar (1966), Vanek (1970) and Meade (1972) to a general theory of labour-managed industries and economies. A basic characteristic of this literature was the maintained assumption that workers in the LMF would maximize dividend per worker-member, defined as the value added per worker. Thus, the LMF chooses inputs in the long and short run so as to maximize
where V is value added, L is labour, K is capital and p is the market price for the firm’s output Y = F(K, L), r is the rental price of capital, and F is the firm’s production function which is assumed to exhibit positive and decreasing marginal products of capital (∂F/∂K) and labour (∂F/∂L)
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© 1993 International Economic Association
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Kleindorfer, P.R., Sertel, M.R. (1993). The Economics of Workers’ Enterprises. In: Bös, D. (eds) Economics in a Changing World. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22988-8_5
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