The Organisational Structure of Western European Cabinets and its Impact on Decision-Making

Abstract

In the previous chapter, we outlined in broad terms the effect of the distinction between single-party and coalition governments on the characteristics of cabinets and in particular on the extent to which these are central, collective, collegial, or conflictual. At this point, however, we need to pause somewhat and examine the part that legal arrangements, as well as traditions and customs, may play on cabinet decision-making processes. For it is widely believed that certain types of rules, for instance about the frequency of meetings or about the procedures adopted at these meetings, have an impact on the extent to which decision-making is collective or not; it is also widely believed that the development of committees markedly contributes to a segmentation of cabinets and therefore to a decrease in their collective character. These matters need to be explored in some detail, although information is not always as readily available as one might have hoped and expected: it is to these questions that we turn in this and the following chapters with a view to assessing how much impact rules, procedures, and other arrangements may have on the way in which decisions are taken.