Abstract
Of the general variables that might help to account for differences in cabinet decision-making processes, the single-party/coalition distinction is the one that appears intuitively to be the most important. The impact of the single-party/coalition distinction in accounting for differences among types of cabinets has long been singled out, indeed somewhat exaggeratedly, as it appears to relate closely to the effect on governments, and in particular to the stability of these governments; to the distinction between two-party systems and systems of more than one party; as well as to the effect on governments of the distinction between majority electoral laws and proportional representation. The stability aspect of the problem has now been systematically examined and the (somewhat limited) relationship with the party composition of the government is well documented.1 These matters do not need further analysis.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See A. Lijphart (1984), pp. 124-6.
In Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, for instance, the christian democrat parties have been in power always, or nearly always despite the fact that, especially since the 1970s, these parties have often obtained only about a third of the votes.
Near-majority cabinets (with the support of 45 per cent of the parlia-mentarians at least) can usually count on the votes of members of small parties and some independents. To this extent, their strength is greater than that of ‘true’ minority cabinets. Swedish social democratic govern-ments, for instance, have needed and typically obtained the consistent support of the small Communist party.
Fianna Fail cabinets have typically been able to govern alone and indeed to dismiss the very idea of coalition as characteristic of weak and divided government. With the emergence of the Progressive Democrats, however, even Fianna Fail had to accept leading a coalition.
J. Blondel (1982), p. 115. A government is defined in this case by the same leader and the same party or parties in power, but not by a new parliament, let alone by a change in the composition of the cabinet.
A.-P. Frognier (1991), p. 121.
Ibid.
For these correlation levels the level of significance is .01 and N= 185. In order to measure dominance, we have used an indicator inspired from the notion of ‘entropy’ in information theory: on the basis of the repartition of portfolios among coalition parties, entropy is maximal if all the parties possess the same number of portfolios and minimal if one party holds all the portfolios. Entropy is measured in the following way. First, absolute entropy is computed by using the following formula: where Pi= NMi/NM, and where NMi = the number of ministers in the party, i and NM = the total number of ministers. E varies between 0 and 1nNP. Second, relative entropy is rE=E/(1nNP) E varies now between 0 and 1. There are three categories: coalitions with strong dominance of a party (rE< .84: 32 cases); coalitions with medium dominance (rE from .84 to .94: 28 cases); and coalitions with weak dominance (rE from .95 to 1: 32 cases).
M. Burch (1988b), p. 24.
B. Farrell (1988), p.41.
T. L. Schou (1988), p. 179.
S. Eriksen (1988b), p. 207.
Among ministers having participated in two cabinets in five countries (Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Italy), the trend was the following. Of those who went from a single-party to a coalition cabinet, 7 respondents stated that there was more debate in the firstthan in the second cabinet and only one stated that there was less; of those who went from a coalition to a single-party cabinet, 5 respondents stated that there was less debate in the second than in the first cabinet and only one stated that there was more.
J.- L. Thiébault, (1988), pp. 100-1. R. B. Andeweg (1988), p. 63.
T. Larsson (1988b), p. 198. B. Farrell (1988), p. 43.
S. Eriksen (1988b), p. 194.
F. Müller-Rommel (1988a), p. 166.
R. Andeweg (1988a), p. 55.
In the Dutch case, however, only two respondents were found to pronounce in the opposite direction.
Among ministers having participated in two cabinets in six countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Italy), the trend was the following. Of those who went from a single party to a coalition cabinet, 8 respondents stated that there was more conflict in the first than in the second cabinet and only two stated that there was less; of those who went from a coalition to a single-party cabinet, 6 respondents stated that there was less conflict in the second than in the first cabinet and only one stated that there was more.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1993 Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Frognier, AP. (1993). The Single-Party/Coalition Distinction and Cabinet Decision-Making. In: Blondel, J., Müller-Rommel, F. (eds) Governing Together. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-22938-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-22936-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)