Abstract
This book is about the characteristics of decision-making processes in Western European governments. It is also about the limits to the collective and collegial nature of these governments, limits that are set in particular by the requirements of efficiency. The problem posed by these limits is at the very root of the functioning of cabinet systems and it touches on a feature that is almost unique to these executives. For practically no other national executive (in fact no other executive except that of Switzerland) requires that governmental decisions be taken by ministers as a group. Clearly dictatorial or even authoritarian systems do not have such a requirement, as they rely primarily on the power of one man or at most on a very small inner group. Nor does the requirement of group decision-making exist in the presidential system, which is the other main form of liberal rule besides parliamentary government; in presidential government, the ‘buck’ can be passed, so to speak, to the chief executive, who appoints the ministers, these being in turn responsible to the president alone, who also allocates among them the tasks that they will have to undertake. In cabinet government, on the other hand, both in theory and to a large extent in practice, ministers and prime ministers form part of a common enterprise in which they have a share.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
There has been an increase in the part played by the parliaments of Western European countries in the legislative scrutiny and even initiation, but the overall role of these parliaments in this context remains relatively small. See for example P. Norton (1990). On the other hand, the personal links between parliaments and governments are close in most Western European countries, although only in a few Western European countries, such as Britain, do ministers have to belong to parliament; in some countries, notably France, the Netherlands, and Norway, they have on the contrary to resign their seats on joining the government. The point is, however, that, whatever the legal requirement, most ministers in cabinet-parliamentary systems proceed from the legislature and have links with the legislature. For a detailed examination of the situation in contemporary Western Europe, see L. de Winter (1991), pp. 44-69.
This was the view expressed by R. H. S. Crossman in the Preface which he wrote to the Fontana edition of Bagehot’s English Constitution (1966). For a more balanced view, see J. P. Mackintosh (1977), pp. 75-84. The extent to which Western European cabinet systems can be regarded as ‘prime ministerial’ will be examined specifically in Chapter 10.
See for instance the first two volumes of the series entitled The Future of Party Government edited by R. Wildenmann, Visions and Realities of Party Government (F. G. Castles and R. Wildenmann, eds., 1986) and Party Governments: European and American Experiences (R. S. Katz, ed., 1987) published by De Gruyter (Berlin) as part of the European University Institute Series.
The concept of consociational democracy was originally developed by A. Lijphart (1968), in order to account for what had been a number of characteristics of Dutch politics. This concept remains of considerable importance even if there are some doubts as to whether Dutch politics continue to fit the model. The concept of ‘adversary politics’ was developed by S. E. Finer and a number of colleagues in S. E. Finer (1975), in order to make a case for proportional representation; but the idea can be regarded as applying as a matter of principle to single-party government, although not all single-party governments behave in an ‘adversarial’ manner with respect to the other parties.
See for instance A. Lijphart (1984), in which the average duration of single party and coalition cabinets is examined. See also W. Bakema (1988), pp. 79-83.
See K. Strom, (1984), pp. 199-228, and K. Strom, (1986), pp. 583-605.
See for instance V. Herman and J. Pope (1973), pp. 191-212. This has been the case of the French governments of M. Rocard, E. Cresson, and P. Beregovoy in the 1988-93 parliament as, after the 1988 General Election, the Socialist party did not have an overall majority in the National Assembly.
A good example of the nature and purpose of coalitions in the United States is given by W. H. Riker (1962). The type of ‘coalition’ that is being discussed in this connection (for the selection of a presidential candidate) is temporary and specific: this is very different from the concept of coalition developed in Western European parliamentary systems (see Riker, 1962, pp. 149-58). In Latin America, though, it seems that coalitions of a number of parties in the government occur relatively often in presidential systems. There are thus examples of the practice in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, and in other countries. However, the conditions under which these coalitions occur and are maintained have not as yet been systematically examined.
The part of the French president in the Fifth Republic has remained similar to that played originally by heads of State in parliamentary systems, however.
These agreements have begun to be studied in detail, especially as, since the 1970s, they have taken the form of lengthy written documents in some countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands.
See note 4 above
As was pointed out in note 9, there have however been coalitions in a number of Latin American presidential systems.
To borrow the expression of W. H. Riker (1962), passim; the approach that this expression characterises may be criticised as unrealistic and therefore clearly unsatisfactory: it none the less helped to launch the systematic analysis of coalition-building in parliamentary systems.
The role of governmental agreements in helping to reduce conflicts in coalition cabinets is still relatively understudied but is how beginning to attract attention.
The question of the role of factions and divisions within parties has begun to be studied in the context of coalition build-up. See M. Laver and K. A. Shepsle (1990), pp. 489-507.
See Chapter 4, p. 81, below. See also in J. Blonde( and F. Müller-Rommel (1988), pp. 210 and 228-9.
See J.- L. Thiebault, ‘The Social Background of Western European Ministers’, in J. Blondel and J.- L. Thiebault (1988), pp. 19-30.
See J. Blondel and F. Müller-Rommel (1988) for a detailed bibliography on works on cabinets in the various Western European countries. See also the bibliography at the end of this volume.
J. P. Mackintosh (1977b).
On the British cabinet, see for instance, among the most recent works, S. James (1992). On the prime minister, see A. King (1985).
P. Avril (1987). J. Nousiainen (1990).
J. Fournier (1987). R.Py (1985).
N. Johnson (1983). R. Mayntz and F. Scharpf (1975).
M. Welan and H. Neisser (1971). A. Ruggeri (1981). E. Spagna Musso (1979).
See, for Ireland, B. Farrell (1987); for the Netherlands: R. Andeweg et al. (1980). W. E. Bakema and I. P. Seeker (1988), pp. 153-70; for Belgium: A. Frognier (1988a), pp. 207-28; for France: M. Dogan (1989), pp. 19-44; for Italy: M. Dogan, ‘How to become a minister in Italy’, in M. Dogan (1989), pp. 99-140, S. Cassese (1981); for Austria: P. Gerlich, W. C. Müller and W. Philipp (1988), pp. 191-206; for Germany: F. Müller-Rommel (1988b), pp. 171-90; for Denmark: A. H. Thomas (1982).
See Appendix I for the description of the ministerial questionnaire.
See Appendix II for the description of the newspaper analysis.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1993 Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Blondel, J., Müller-Rommel, F. (1993). Introduction. In: Blondel, J., Müller-Rommel, F. (eds) Governing Together. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22936-9_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-22938-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-22936-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)