Abstract
I was saying that the problems of presidentialism are not in the executive arena but in the legislative arena. Thus far, therefore, I have answered only the easy part of the question, How strong should an intermittent president be allowed to be? Its difficult part begins with asking, How can his governing avoid parliamentary obstructionism? More exactly put, How much legislative power does a president need in order to have his legislation passed by parliament?
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© 1994 Giovanni Sartori
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Sartori, G. (1994). The Paradox of Governing by Legislating. In: Comparative Constitutional Engineering. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-22863-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-22861-4
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