Skip to main content
  • 41 Accesses

Abstract

Harry Truman was fond of observing that a statesman was nothing more than a dead politician. The diplomatic career of Dean Acheson does not conform to that cynical definition. He was a statesman while he was alive. On the other hand, for all his famous disdain for those he called ‘primitives’ in the media and politics, he was not immune to the politics of foreign policy. In exploring how he dealt with an entirely new factor in both diplomacy and politics, nuclear weapons, we see Acheson as both statesman and politician.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969) 36, 113.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948) 644–5.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Byrnes’s fall from grace as an indicator of a policy shift is treated in Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origins of the Cold War ( Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982 ) 150–80.

    Google Scholar 

  4. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The Atomic Years, 1945–1950 (New York, 1964) 10, 27.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson, The New World, 1939–1946 ( University Park, Penn., 1962 ) 536–53.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years (New York, 1960), 369–72. Hewlett and Anderson, New World, 611–19. Mark Oliphant, ‘Three Men and the Bomb’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 45, 2 (March, 1989): 41–2. For fuller accounts of the Baruch Plan’s place in early Cold War atomic diplomacy see Greg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War (New York, 1980 ) 151–70;

    Google Scholar 

  7. Larry Gerber, ‘The Bartsch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History 6 (Winter 1982): 69–95;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988) 161–96.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947–1952 (University Park, Penn, 1969) 384. Even before receiving the GAC report, the President, with unanimous NSC support, had approved an accelerated fission bomb program. FRUS, 1949 v. 1, 561–4.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York, 1962) 219.

    Google Scholar 

  11. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (Boston, 1967) 472–4.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1993 Douglas Brinkley

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Messer, R.L. (1993). Acheson, the Bomb, and the Cold War. In: Brinkley, D. (eds) Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22611-5_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics