Abstract
Security in the Middle East has often been treated as a function of military and structural variables. Drawing largely on strategic theories, analysts have focused heavily, if not exclusively, on system structures, alliance patterns, force structures, the relative distribution of capabilities, and military spending to explains wars of opportunity. Wars of ‘opportunity’ occur when leaders estimate that they have superior military capability, at least in the short-term; that their use of force will not encounter serious resistance, either from their target or from allied states; and they see the opportunity to make significant gains. Although wars of opportunity have occurred in the Middle East, they have occurred less frequently than wars of ‘vulnerability’. Consequently, an analysis that focuses primarily on opportunity-driven wars can be inappropriate and misleading as an explanation of security and ‘insecurity’ in the Middle East in the past and as a guide to the future.
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Notes
For an examination of the sources of inadvertent war, see Alexander L. George (ed.), Preventing War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991).
See Jack L. Snyder, ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) pp. 153–79.
Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2 (January 1978) pp. 167–214.
Iraq’s armed forces numbered 188 000 in 1977, and 1 000 000 in 1987; Iran’s forces numbered 342 000 in 1977 and 645 500 in 1987, excluding 350 000 listed as reserves; Syria’s forces numbered 227 500 in 1977 and 407 500 in 1987; and Saudi Arabia’s forces numbered 61 500 in 1977 and 73 500 in 1987. Israel’s reserve system makes troop strength comparisons difficult, but in the same period its armoured capability grew by 25 per cent. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), The Military Balance, 1977/78 and 1987/88.
The plan is described in detail by Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947–74 (London: MacDonald and Jane’s, 1978) pp. 240–1.
Even correcting for inflation, the increase in defence expenditures is exponential. In 1967, Israel spent US$463 million, and in 1987, US$5,110; Egypt spent US$655 million in 1967, US$4,570m in 1987; Iraq spent US$266 million in 1967, US$11,580m in 1987; Syria spent US$125 million in 1967, US$3,950m in 1987; Saudi Arabia spent US$286 million in 1967, US$16,230m in 1987; and Iran spent US$480 million in 1967 and US$6,110m in 1987. The figures are taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), The Military Balance, 1967/68 and 1987/88.
Fred H. Lawson, ‘Domestic Social Conflict and Foreign Policy in Contemporary Syria’, unpublished paper, 1988.
The Unified Arab Command was established at the Arab summit meeting in Cairo in 1964. It drew up a detailed plan which described the measures needed to improve Arab defences and offensive capabilities against Israel. Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to finance the development of military capabilities in the ‘confrontation’ states. Arab states were also asked to avoid providing Israel with a pretext to start a preventive war; included was the instruction that no Arab state bordering Israel should either encourage or tolerate raids into Israel’s territory. See Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quartet Books, 1981) p. 12;
Wasfi al-Tal, Writings in Arab Affairs (Amman: Dar al-Liwa, 1980, in Arabic) p. 326; and
Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge University Press, 1987) p. 58.
‘Statement by Shams al-Din Badran on Events Preceding the June War of 1967’, Al-Ahram, 2 February 1968. Reprinted in Zuhair Diab (ed.), International Documents on Palestine 1968 (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971) Doc. 298, pp. 319–22, p. 319.
In 1960, for example, the balance-of-payments deficit was US$34.7 million; by 1963, it had risen to US$171.6 million. By 1964, many factories were operating below capacity. See Adeed Dawisha, ‘Perceptions, Decisions, and Consequences in Foreign Policy: The Egyptian Intervention in Yemen’, Political Studies 25 (June 1977) pp. 201–26.
King Hussein recalls: ‘I was in Aqaba when I heard of Egypt’s decision to call for the withdrawal of the international police force from Sinai and to place the Egyptian Army in its place and to close the Straits of Tiran. At that particular moment I knew… that war was imminent….’ Hussein, My Profession as a King (Amman: Ghaleb Toukan, 1978, in Arabic) pp. 208–9.
For detailed discussion of these two strategies and their requirements, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990) Occasional Paper 8;
and Janice Gross Stein, ‘Deterrence and Reassurance’, in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern and Charles Tilly (eds), Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
See, for example, Gabriel Ben-Dor, State and Conflict in the Middle East: The Emergence of the Postcolonial State (New York: Praeger, 1983);
Fuad Ajami, ‘The End of Pan-Arabism’, Foreign Affairs 57, 2 (Winter 1978/79) pp. 355–73; and The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought Since 1967 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
I. William Zartman, ‘Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation’, in D. B. Bendahmane and J. W. McDonald Jr (eds), Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, 1986); and Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
Janice Gross Stein, ‘Prenegotiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Paradoxes of Success and Failure’, and ‘Getting to the Table: The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotiation’, in Janice Gross Stein (ed.), Getting to the Table: Processes of International Prenegotiation (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
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© 1993 Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen
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Stein, J.G. (1993). The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead. In: Korany, B., Noble, P., Brynen, R. (eds) The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22568-2_3
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