Abstract
In considering the use and effectiveness of freezing sovereign assets as an economic sanction, the Iranian case has been analysed exhaustively here. Out of all the freezes that have so far been imposed by the United States, the Iranian case embodies each and every aspect of this policy measure. The Iranian assets freeze and its implementation was a test case that provided lessons both for the United States administration and for those countries that are vulnerable to future assets’ freezes. The wide-ranging application of the freeze and the huge sums that were involved posed legal, financial and political questions, the handling of which will no doubt be considered by US policy-makers and should also be examined carefully by those who could be subjected to such measures.1
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Notes
The annual economic impact of the freeze during the two-year period 1979–81 came to over $3.3 billion loss to the Iranian economy. This is according to a study by G.C. Hufbauer and J.J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, History and Current Policy, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 1985. However, this is just an estimate and only for two years. The real economic impact of the freeze and its consequent political impact for Iran have yet to be evaluated.
R. Carswell, ‘Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience’, Foreign Affairs, 60, 1981, pp. 247–65.
The linkage was originally suggested by John Hoffman, from the law firm of Shearman & Stirling representing Citibank, in February 1980. See J. E. Hoffman, ‘The Bankers’ Channel’, American Hostages in Iran: the Conduct of a Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, p. 242.
F.D. Logan and C.C. Lichtenstein, ‘Political Dams Across Financial Flows’, Private Investors Abroad Problems and Solutions in International Business, 1986, chapter 13, pp. 13–27. Logan is a partner in the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy that represent Chase Manhattan Bank. He was Chase’s chief legal representative in the Iranian assets litigation and played a major role in drafting the Algiers Accords. Lichtenstein is a law professor in Boston College Law School and consultant to Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.
See B. J. Cohen, International Banking and American Foreign Policy: In Whose Interest?, Council on Foreign Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1986, chapter 4.
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© 1993 Mahvash Alerassool
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Alerassool, M. (1993). Conclusion. In: Freezing Assets. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22532-3_8
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