Abstract
The problems faced by US banks with respect to the litigation in Europe, concerning Iranian offshore assets, could not be resolved in favour of the banks and policy objectives of the US administration by court decisions. The United States was faced, on the one hand, with the hostage crisis and, on the other hand, with the crisis that was created as a result of the freeze. The hostage crisis had far reaching political implications for both Iran and the United States, while the freeze posed new issues in European and US courts with significant legal and financial implications.1
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Notes
See K. Roosevelt, Counter Coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979.
However, for a brief period he did have problems with the administration of President Kennedy, see J. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1988, pp. 132–41.
See P. Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations, Andre Deutsch, London, 1981, pp. 3–5.
See F. Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 94–5.
See, e.g. W. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, W. W. Norton, New York, London, 1981;
A. Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974–1979, Cape, London, 1984;
G. W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, Norton, New York, 1982, pp. 455–62;
G. Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran, Tauris, London, 1985;
Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1983, pp. 354–98;
C. Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983, pp. 314–48;
J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, Collins, London, 1982, pp. 433–51;
R. E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran, Deutsch, London, 1986.
R. Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1980, p. 219.
For an indication of the extent of the Carter administration’s preoccupation with the hostage question see H. Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, Putnam, New York, 1982. Jordan was White House Chief of Staff and one of President Carter’s closest advisers.
See R. Assersohn, The Biggest Deal, Methuen, London, 1982, pp. 105–7.
Brzezinski was in favour of military attack against Iran from the very beginning of the crisis. In his view such an attack was a matter of honour as well as ‘a moral and political obligation to the prisoners’. See Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Failed Mission’, Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28–40.
See, e.g. Z. Brzezinski, ‘The Failed Mission’, Time Magazine, 18 October 1982, pp. 28–40.
See generally O. R. Holsti and J. N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown, of Consensus, Allen & Unwin, Boston, 1984.
See A. K. Samii, Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran, Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1987, p. x.
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© 1993 Mahvash Alerassool
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Alerassool, M. (1993). The Hostage Crisis and the Secret Negotiations that Led to Its Resolution. In: Freezing Assets. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22532-3_4
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