Factors Limiting the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions

  • Makio Miyagawa


In Chapters 3 and 4 not only were a number of cases identified where economic sanctions were successful, largely owing to the existence of favourable conditions, but also some cases where they proved unsuccessful despite the existence of such conditions. This suggests that in situations where such conditions are satisfied there may, nevertheless, be other factors which can limit the efficacy of sanctions. These factors are investigated in this chapter.


Security Council Historical Experience Dividend Payment Economic Sanction Military Conflict 
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Copyright information

© Makio Miyagawa 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Makio Miyagawa
    • 1
  1. 1.Russian DivisionMinistry of Foreign AffairsJapan

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