From Negotiation to Confrontation

  • James Tuck-Hong Tang


After Britain’s recognition of the Beijing government, policy-makers in London expected that formal diplomatic contact and channels would be set up smoothly. They were to be disappointed as their expectation failed to materialize. Beijing’s immediate response was not entirely negative; the new leaders in China expressed a willingness to establish diplomatic rela-tions. The problem for Britain was that recognition was considered by the new Chinese leadership merely as a first step towards normal diplomatic relations which required negotiations. The Chinese side’s insistence for negotiations proved to be only the first of many hurdles that the British government had to cross in implementing their China policy of ‘keeping a foot in the door’.


Chinese Government Security Council Policy Implementation British Government Chinese Leader 
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  1. 49.
    See A. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960) p. 53;Google Scholar
  2. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) p. 263.Google Scholar
  3. 72.
    For an account of Liu’s visit see Michael Lindsay, China and the Cold War (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1955) pp. 12–16.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© James Tuck-Hong Tang 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Tuck-Hong Tang
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Hong KongChina

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