Abstract
The three preceding chapters have together considered a wide variety of theories of political obligation and it has been argued that all are, to some considerable extent, unsatisfactory. None of the theories so far discussed provides a convincing general account of political obligation. Inevitably the failure of these theories is likely to give rise to doubts about there being a persuasive general theory of political obligation and it is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that in recent years a number of philosophers have come to more or less sceptical conclusions about the possibility of a philosophically cogent account of political obligation (e.g. Green, 1988; Simmons, 1979, 1987; Smith, 1973a; and Wolff, 1976). Similarly, the perceived failure of attempts to justify political obligation has led to the suspicion that there are few, if any, such obligations and that consequently there is no special moral relationship between people and the polity of which they are members. This is a possibility which is taken most seriously by the differing styles of anarchist thought.
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© 1992 John Horton
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Horton, J. (1992). Anarchism: Political and Philosophical. In: Political Obligation. Issues in Political Theory. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22286-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22286-5_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-36785-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-22286-5
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