North-North and North-South Debt Crises and the Role of Trade Adjustments

  • Pier Carlo Padoan
Part of the Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy book series (CICETP)


This paper addresses two questions. First it discusses some of the aspects of the interconnections between the North-South debt crisis and the more recent North-North debt crisis, i.e. the build-up of the US external debt. It also links the financial problems which have emerged from this interconnection to the trade imbalances which represent the other side of the coin of financial disequilibria. It takes a systemic, and medium term, perspective in the sense that it considers the relations between the large economic areas and their evolution, Secondly attention is centered upon the international organization of both financial and trade adjustments and how they are interconnected. In particular it is discussed how and to what extent cooperation in international finance and trade are facilitated by the current state of international relations, characterized by the replacement of US hegemony with a multipolar structure. Analysis draws on the theory of international financial crises, on the theory of strategic trade policies as well as on the theory of international regimes.


Public Good Latin American Country Trade Balance Debt Crisis Trade Deficit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© SIPI Srl, Rivista di Politica Economica 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pier Carlo Padoan
    • 1
  1. 1.Università di UrbinoItaly

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