Abstract
One statement of the Delors report refers to the idea that once the economic and monetary union is established the body responsible for monetary policy ‘should be independent of instructions from national governments and Community authorities’ (Delors et al., 1989, para. 32). Although the committee decided on this recommendation unanimously it turned out to be one of the most disputed points of the report. On the one hand, it is emphasised by those arguing that Central Banks’ independence provides the first essential of a sound monetary policy. On the other hand some political leaders — especially in France and Great Britain — vehemently criticise this proposal. The question of independence of a possible future European Central Bank System (ECBS) will thus certainly remain an important matter of debate in the process of European monetary integration.
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© 1992 Confederation of European Economic Associations
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Caesar, R. (1992). A European Central Bank: The Issue of Independence. In: Baltensperger, E., Sinn, HW. (eds) Exchange-Rate Regimes and Currency Unions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22039-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22039-7_11
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