France and the Defence of Europe: Redefining Continental Security

Abstract

For over a quarter of a century, France has basked in the tropical sunshine of ‘Gaullism’. After the hurricanes and earthquakes of the 1940s, which brought in their wake war, occupation, devastation and humiliation, and the chill winds and hailstorms of the 1950s, which engendered retreat, indignity, fear and insecurity, President de Gaulle swiftly brought about a radically different security climate. The 1960s offered a traumatised nation the twin benefits of national independence and an end to military conflict. Two innovations were sufficient to effect this revolution: the institution of a strong executive presidency, and the development of an independent nuclear deterrent. The very existence of each reinforced the credibility and enhanced the political function of the other. It was a symbiotic relationship in which both were permanent winners. In the maelstrom of post-war history, the major issue for France was the redefinition of her international role. This quest precluded for several decades any structured relationship with her European neighbours