New Thinking about World Communism
A good deal has been said and written about the relevance of the ‘New Political Thinking’ to Soviet foreign and security policy — the subjects of arms control, Soviet–American relations and regional problems have been much discussed. We have heard much less about the attitude of the Gorbachev regime — or popular attitudes — toward international communism, the Soviet bloc, and the prospect of ‘world revolution’.
KeywordsDepression Europe Stratification Pyramid Ferro
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- 4.German Diligensky, “Revolyutsionnaya teoriya i sovremennost”, MEMO, no. 3, 1988, pp. 15–25; English translation also in Steve Hirsch (ed.), MEMO (Washington, D.C.: BNA, 1989), pp. 30–45.Google Scholar
- Institute of World History, USSR Academy of Sciences, Revolutions and Reforms in World History (Moscow: Nauka, 1990), pp. 236–53.Google Scholar
- Marc Ferro (eds), 50/50: Opyt slovarya novogo myshleniya (Moscow: Progress, 1989), pp. 70–2, 86–9.Google Scholar
- 6.This and the following paragraphs are based on the sources cited in the preceding footnotes as well as some forty interviews conducted by the author in Moscow in April and May 1990. There are few other Western analyses of this subject. See, however, Steven Kull, ‘Dateline Moscow: Burying Lenin’, Foreign Policy, no. 78, Spring 1990, pp. 172–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- 12.For earlier Soviet approaches to Eastern Europe, see, for example, Sarah Terry (ed.), Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)Google Scholar
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967)Google Scholar
- Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 145ff.Google Scholar
- 24.The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee continued to handle the extensive contacts with foreign communist parties. But there was a growing sense in official circles in Moscow that somehow these contacts did not matter as much as they had earlier on. Indeed, while previously it had been important which of several rival communist parties or factions in a given country (for instance, Finland, India, Japan, Greece, or Spain) Moscow was prepared to deal with and in effect recognize as the legitimate one, it had become the tendency under Gorbachev to deal with all such groups, in the novel spirit of ecumenical diversity. On its background and activities, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, The Role of the International Department in the Soviet Foreign Policy Process (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1989).Google Scholar