Abstract
Is the ongoing Indian arms buildup justified? Or is there, indeed, a significant disproportionate increase in India’s military capabilities over previous decades? Critics claim that there is an excessive growth that is destabilising the region. The Government of India and its supporters insist that such claims are without basis. 1
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Notes
In an interview in January 1990, senior political officers at the Embassy oflndia in Washington, D.C., denied that there was a significant relative increase in Indian allocations to defence beyond the usual annual increases. One official expressed surprise to hear from me that there had been one. Interviews.
Figures derived from The Military Balance, 1989–90, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989.
The average Indian GNP growth rate figures were obtained from Statistical Outline of India, 1988–89, Tata Services Limited, Bombay, 1988, p. 5.
See The Military Balance: 1988–89 and 1989–90, op. cit.
Note that there is not necessarily a close correlation between GNP growth rates and annual increases in the defence allocation in previous years. This may be due to time lags or delayed official responses, or urgent military demands given arms procurement by India’s military rivals. In the past there were increases in defence allocations of 4.3 per cent from 1978 to 1979, 18.3 per cent from 1979 to 1980, 16.2 per cent from 1980 to 1981, 2.8 per cent from 1981 to 1982, and 5.5 per cent from 1982 to 1983. There were annual GNP growth rates of -4.8 per cent in 1979 to 1980, 7.5 per cent in 1980 to 1981, 5.2 per cent in 1981 to 1982, and 1.8 per cent in 1982 to 1983. Percentage defence increases over the previous year were calculated from annual Indian defence budget figures provided by issues of The Military Balance from 198-81 to 1984–85. GNP growth rates were derived from India 1981: A Reference Annual, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, p. 34; and from The Times of India Directory and Yearbook, 1984, Times of India Press, Bombay , no date, p. 288.
For an analysis of the Tamil crisis in Sri Lanka, see Dilip Mukerjee, ‘Grim Lanka Scenario’, Times of India, 16 January, 1990.
For some contemporary analyses of the Kashmir problem, see two reports by Askari H. Zaidi, ‘Politics: Behind the Increasing Militancy in Kashmir’, and ‘Personality: A Conversation with Abdul Ghani Lone,’ Times of India, I January, 1990. Abdul Ghani Lone is the ‘founder chairman’ of the Kashmiri People’s Conference. He and his daughter, Ms. Shabnab Lone, are representing several arrested Kashmiri militants in various cases filed by the Government of India under the Public Safety Act and the Anti-Terrorist Act. See also reports by Balraj Puri, ‘Roots of Terrorism in Kashmir Valley,’ and K. Shankar Bajpai, ‘Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani Relations’, Times of India, 11 January , 1990; and Raju G. C. Thomas, ‘Tug-of-War over Kashmir’, Christian Science Monitor, 30 January, 1990.
For an assessment of Indo-Pakistani relations in 1989, see Dawn Overseas Weekly (Karachi), 20 July and 2 August , 1989. See also Jasjit Singh, ‘Indo-Pakistani Relations: Simla Holds the Key’, Times of India, 19 January, 1990; and K.R. Malkani, ‘Towards Warmer IndoPakistani Ties’, Times of India, 23 January, 1990.
See Raju G. C. Thomas, ‘The Melancholy Chapter of Tibet’, Christian Science Monitor, 22 October, 1987.
For recent analyses of the Sino-Indian dispute, See Sumit Ganguly, ‘Sino-Indian Border Talks, 1981–89’, Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 12, December 1989, pp. 1123–35. See also Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1975. For an earlier controversial assessment of the dispute, see Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 1971.
See Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., pp. 19–50.
From The Military Balance, 1971–72, op. cit.
The figures that follow are from The Military Balance: 1989–90.
See Jasjit Singh, ‘Pakistan Mounts Big Military Exercise’, Times of India, 6 December, 1989.
See News India, New York, 22 December, 1989.
See reports in the Times of India, February 1 and 2, 1990.
Times of India, 9 February, 1988.
See Mohan Guruswamy, ‘Stingers: A New Threat in South Asia’, Times of India, 25 February, 1988.
For a recent study of the growth and development of this service, see Robert H. Bruce (Ed.), The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, Perth, Australia, Curtin University of Technology, 1989.
See Raju G. C. Thomas, ‘The Sources oflndian Naval Expansion’, and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and Objectives of India’s Naval Expansion’, in Robert H. Bruce, Ibid., pp. 95–108, and pp. 5–50.
See reports in the Times of India, 24 February, 1988; and 21 March, 1988.
For an analysis, seeK. Subrahmanyam, ‘Nuclear Submarines Vital for Defence’, in India Abroad, New York, 18 March, 1988
See remarks made by Vice Admiral (Retd.) K. K. Nayyar in Navy News and Undersea Technology, Washington D.C., vol. 6, no. 13, 3 April, 1989, pp. 1–2.
See report by Michael Danby entitled, ‘India Rules the Waves’, in The West Australian, 12 July, 1988. The synopsis of the article reads: ‘Australia’s Defence Minister, Kim Beazley has described it as ‘intriguing’ ... but there is nagging worry among some nations of the Indian Ocean basin, including Australia, that it could herald something more dangerous’.
See two articles by Harvey Stockwin, ‘Chinese Ambitions in South China Sea’, Times of India, 2 March, 1988; and ‘Prolonging Tension in South China Sea’, Times of India, 3 March, 1990. See also earlier report entitled, ‘China’s Bid to Strengthen Its Navy’, Times of India, 9, February, 1988 .
For a report on the Agni IRBM launch, see report in The New York Times, 23 May, 1989; and for the second Prithvi SRBM launch, see The Hindu, Madras, 28 September, 1989.
For a rationalization proposing a major Indian missile program, see K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Missile Control Regime: Case for a Stepped-Up Indian Effort’, Times of India, 31 January, 1989.
Pakistani as well as Indian nuclear weapons developments are discussed in Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, Ballinger Publishers, Cambridge, Mass., 1988, pp. 69–153.
Parts of this section from here on are derived from my paper entitled, ‘The Nuclear Question in South Asia’ delivered at the International Studies Association Convention, in Washington D.C., April 10–14, 1990. See also Raju G. C. Thomas, ‘Should India Sign the NPT?’ in Robert Pendley and Joseph Pilat, Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT, The Plenum Press for Los Alamos National Laboratory, New York, 1990, pp. 133–50.
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© 1992 Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon
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Raju, G., Thomas, C. (1992). The Growth of Indian Military Power: From Sufficient Defence to Nuclear Deterrence. In: Babbage, R., Gordon, S. (eds) India’s Strategic Future. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21885-1_3
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