Skip to main content

Domestic Foundations of India’s Security Policy

  • Chapter
India’s Strategic Future

Abstract

A country’s security policy evolves by way of a constant dialogue between domestic and external factors. This is particularly so for a democratic and heterogeneous nation such as India that exists within ‘turbulent frontiers’. 1 The nature of the dialogue and the rules that govern it will change with time and it is impossible in a chapter such as this to convey the picture in its full complexity. What I will seek to do instead is describe a number of paradigms that provide the framework within which the dialogue on security policy has been conducted at various times since India became independent. I will then draw on these paradigms to see how security policy might unfold in future2

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. The phrase belongs to John S. Galbraith and is quoted by Ashley J. Tellis. See Tellis’ paper, ‘Securing the Barrack: the Logic, Structure and Objectives of India’s Naval Expansion’, in R. Bruce (Ed.), The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean, Perth, 1989, p. 7.

    Google Scholar 

  2. While I have placed predominant paradigms in specific time frames, in reality the edges were far more blurred than suggested here, with some elements of a particular structure of beliefs persisting long after the predominant paradigm had disappeared.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Pran Chopra, ‘Security, Sovereignty, and India-Sri Lanka Relations’ in S. Kumar (Ed.) Yearbook on India’s Foreign Policy 1987/1988, New Delhi, 1988, p. 107.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Tellis, op. cit., pp. 7–12.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Quoted in O. P. Singh, Strategic Sikkim, New Delhi, 1985, p. 37.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Under the accord, Sri Lanka undertook that ‘Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in any manner prejudicial to India’s interest’ [Emphasis added]. Quoted in V. Suryanarayan, ‘India-Sri Lanka Accord and the prospects for security in South Asia’, in K. P. Misra and V. D. Chopra (Eds.), South Asia-Pacific Region Emerging Trends, New Delhi, 1988, p. 132.

    Google Scholar 

  7. J. Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, New Delhi, 1961, p. 128.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Quoted in P. Gupte, India: The Challenge of Change, London, 1989, p. 317.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Nehru, op. cit., p. 3 and p. 23.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Y. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in Foreign Policy Making: The Siner Indian Conflict, 1959-1962, BouldeF, Colorado, 1984, p. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  11. H. Rizvi, ‘Civil-Military Relations and National Stability in South Asia’, Pakistan Horizon, XLII, No. 2, April, 1989, p. 64.

    Google Scholar 

  12. S. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, Berkeley, 1971, pp. 71–2.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Quoted from B. Warriawalla, in Illustrated Weekly of India, 11–17 June, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 190.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Nehru, op. cit., p. 456: ‘We did not accept it [Pakistan] at any time on the basis of the two nation theory.’

    Google Scholar 

  16. For a contemporary expression of this view see Jasjit Singh, ‘Indian Ocean and Indian Security’, in S. Kumar (Ed.), Yearbook on India’s Foreign Policy, 1987/88, New Delhi, 1988, p. 133.

    Google Scholar 

  17. These views were expounded originally by Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt. See R. C. Dutt, The Economic History of India in the Victorian Age, London, 1956, and D. Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, London, 1901.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Evidence of Admiral Nayyer to the United States Global Strategy Council Forum, p. 38 (transcript prepared in Washington and dated 9 October, 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  19. V. S. Arunachalam, ‘Defence, Technology and Development: an Indian Experience’, conference on Implications of the New Technology for Australian Regional Security, SDSC, Canberra, November, 1989, p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  20. The armed forces from time to time complain about this diversity and maintain it is inefficient. Indian Defence Review Research Team, ‘Weapons and Equipment State: are we getting our money’s worth’, Indian Defence Review, July, 1988, p. 141.

    Google Scholar 

  21. D. Norman (Ed.), Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. 1, London, 1965, p. 55.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Nehru, op. cit., p. 58.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Noor A. Hussain, ‘India’s Regional Policy: Strategic and Security Dimensions’, in S. Cohen (Ed.), The Security of South Asia, American and Asian perspectives, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, c. 1987, p. 31.

    Google Scholar 

  25. See Giri Deshinkar’s report of his visit to China as a member if an Indian delegation, Times of India, 13 December, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Vertzberger, op. cit., p. xvi.

    Google Scholar 

  27. The decline of Congress in this period has been documented inter alia by L. &S. Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, Chicago, 1987; R. Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India?, London, 1986; and F. Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947–1977, Princeton, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  28. RavindraNath in the Indian Express, 9 April, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  29. The Janata Government also attempted to remove English as the basic language of the officer corps and to suppress British traditions. See Maj. K. C. Praval, The Indian Army After Independence, New Delhi, 1987, p. 604.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Economic and Political Weekly, XVIII, 9 April, 1983, No. 15, p. 558.

    Google Scholar 

  31. R. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, Princeton, 1986, p. 7.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 196.

    Google Scholar 

  33. See Sinha writing in the Indian Defence Review, January, 1987, p. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  34. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Rudolph and Rudolph, op. cit., p. 87.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Sinha, op. cit., p. 32.

    Google Scholar 

  37. See Frankel, op. cit. pp. 523–8, for the situation in 1974.

    Google Scholar 

  38. In the district of Meerut alone a total of 2.3 million persons are either ex-servicemen or associated with servicemen through family. Lt. Colonel Shyam Singh, ‘Peasant Agitation and Internal Security’, Indian Defence Review, July, 1988, p. 134.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Jeffrey, op. cit., p. 30 refers to the benefits of returning ex-jawans in the Punjab. The returning soldier factor may have contributed considerably to the ‘green revolution’ in the Indian North-West, the region in which the agricultural revolution has been most successful.

    Google Scholar 

  40. C. Lenneberg, ‘Sharad Joshi and the Farmers: The Middle Peasant Lives’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 61, Fall 1988, No. 3, p. 451.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Singh, op. cit., p. 134.

    Google Scholar 

  42. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Indian Defence Review Research Team, Indian Defence Review, July, 1988, p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  44. See for example Maj. Gen. E. Habibulla, The Sinews of Indian Defence, New Delhi, 1981, p. 213.

    Google Scholar 

  45. When General Sundarji took over as Army Chief of Staff, he wrote a letter to all his officers. The letter dealt fundamentally with issues relating to the poor morale in the forces. Many officers evidently felt that the letter failed to come to grips with the basic issues. See Indian Defence Review, July, 1986, p. 217, anonymous letter referring to the Sundarji letter.

    Google Scholar 

  46. These problems have not been lost on governments. Under the Fourth Pay Commission, pay and pensions have been improved considerably. Ex-military have been inducted into the 500,000-strong paramilitary forces. The crack National security Guard was formed in part for this purpose in 1985. See J. Masselos, ‘India: a power on the move’, Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 64, March, 1988, No. 10, p. 26, for this last point.

    Google Scholar 

  47. L. &S. Rudolph, op. cit., p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  48. Frankel, op. cit., pp. 527-8.

    Google Scholar 

  49. Jeffrey, op. cit., p. 157.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Patriot, 15 August, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Report of a speech by Mrs Gandhi at Lucknow, Statesman, 21 December, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

  52. P. Galbraith, ‘Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Containing the Threat’, report to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, 1988, p. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Report on a public interest advertisement on Doordarshan TV, Times of India, 22 July, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Tewari saw it as the media’s role to create this new self-image. Illustrated Weekly of India, 28 May, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Leo Rose, ‘India’s Regional Policy: Non Military Dimensions’ in S. Cohen, The Security of South Asia, p. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Pran Chopra maintains that the growing feeling on the part of Indian Tamils prompted New Delhi to shift its thinking from the view that the ethnic problem was Sri Lanka’s alone to one in which India had a say. Chopra, op. cit., p. 1ll.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Quoted in Defense and Foreign Affairs, December, 1988, p. 17.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, South-East Asia Report, No. 1044, 4 September, 1981, p. 188; Times of India, 24 February, 1982. See also Walter K. Anderson and Shridhar D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism, Westview Press, Boulder, Colarado, 1987, p. 135.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Y. K. Malik and D. K. Vajpeyi, ‘The Rise of Hindu Militancy: India’s Secular Democracy at Risk’, Asian Survey, Vol. xxix, March 1989, No. 3, p. 318.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Tata Services Limited, Statistical Outline of India, 1988–89, Bombay, 1988, p. 67.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Thomas, op. cit., p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  62. The Hindu, 9 April, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  63. Tata Services, op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  64. B. Wariavwalla, op.cit., p. 17; Malik and Vajpeyi, op. cit., p. 320; Jeffrey, op. cit., p. 157.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Malik and Vajpeyi, Ibid., p. 321; Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 191.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Malik and Vajpeyi, Ibid, p. 320.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Ibid, pp. 320–1.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Statement by former Foreign Secretary, Eric Gonzalves, at a conference on South Asia, LaTrobe University, Melbourne, 8 December, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Sarah Sargent, Australian Financial Review, 4 December, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  70. For example, he appointed India’s first Muslim Home Minister.

    Google Scholar 

  71. S. Gupta and P. Guha, ‘Heading for a Crisis’, India Today, 28 February, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Deshinkar, op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  73. Editorial, Times of India, 14 December, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Bhabani Sen Gupta, Illustrated Weekly of India, XXIV, No. 3, 21 January, 1989, p. 120.

    Google Scholar 

  75. India Today, 31 August, 1990, pp. 33–4.

    Google Scholar 

  76. In 1977, when Mrs Gandhi was ousted, she received a solid vote from the South, as did Rajiv in the 1989 election.

    Google Scholar 

  77. The Congress (I) recently sponsored its own consecration ceremony at Ayodhya using a leading religious figure as proxy, with the objective of embarrassing the NF government. See Sunday, 20–26 May, 1990 and India Today, 31 May, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  78. There are already indications that this is occurring with respect to intercommunal unrest in Kashmir. See a report in The Canberra Times, 30 January, 1990. Dr Robin Jeffrey pointed out on the ABC Program AsiaPacific on 10 February, 1990, that in the context of the deteriorating Kashmir dispute Iran had offered moral support to Pakistan and that India had in turn sought a statement of support from the Soviet Union, which itself has problems with its Muslim minority. Iran did, in fact,cancel a scheduled visit by the Indian Foreign Minister in response to the situation in Kahsmir.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Canberra Times, 30 January, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  80. The Singh government recently banned the sale of petrol on Sundays in an attempt to reduce the rapid rise in the consumption of petroleum products that has accompanied India’s economic growth and contributed significantly to the balance of payments problem.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Gupta and Guha report that the falling value of the rupee alone contributed a Rs14 bn. rise in defence spending in 1988–89. Gupta and Guha, op. cit. Between 1986–87 and 1988–89, India’s foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold and SDRs) fell from Rs 76.45 bn. to Rs 62.8 bn, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, submission to Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Enquiry into Relations with India, June, 1989, Annex B.

    Google Scholar 

  82. The armed services, paramilitary, defence, space and nuclear industries together employ approximately 2 million people, which is almost one quarter of those employed in the formal factory sector and 8% of those employed in the total formal sector. Figures derived from Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 224–5 and Tata Services, op. cit., p. 81 and p. 135.

    Google Scholar 

  83. See Amin Gupta, ‘India’s Mixed Performance’, Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 7, May, 1989, No. 5, pp. 44–52.

    Google Scholar 

  84. See D.P. Chaudhri, Recent Trends in the Indian Economy, Working Paper No. 88/2, NCDS, Canberra, 1988, Table 2, p. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  85. Within these sectors, some sub-sectors such as machine tools and electronics have performed exceptionally well. See for example,Annual Reportof the Department of Electronics, as reported in the Times of India, 23 May, 1990. The electronics sector grew by 31% and exports of electronics by 63% in 1989. In the past two years exports of engineering products have doubled. See India Today, 15 August, 1990, p. 42.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Chaudhri, op. cit., p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  87. See Economist Intelligence Unit, India, Nepal Country Report, No. 2, 1989 (quarterly, London), p. 23 for the requirements of the energy sector. The same publication (p. 27) points out that India also faces a ‘crisis’ in road transport in the next decade.

    Google Scholar 

  88. The 1990 Budget lowered company tax from 50% to 40%. There is no evidence to date that the government is seeking to reverse the liberalis~ tion measures introduced in 1985. If anything, liberalisation will continue at a steady rather than a dramatic pace. See Asiaweek, 25 May, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  89. World Bank, India: Recent Developments and Medium-Term Issues, Vol. l, 1988, p. ii.

    Google Scholar 

  90. For a further exposition of the argument that Indian defence expenditure is not overly burdensome, seeR. Thomas in R. Bruce (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 103–5.

    Google Scholar 

  91. The ISS Strategic Balance 1988/89 reports a rate of expenditure for Pakistan of 6.5% for 1986 (p. 226). In reality the rate would be higher because a significant amount of Pakistan’s expenditure is not reported. The same document reports China as having a rate of 2.6% for the same year; but again, this would be a serious underestimation. India’s defence spending is also under-reported, but is on the whole more transparent than Pakistan’s or China’s. Ravi Rikhye estimates that India’s rate of expenditure could be as high as 5% of GNP. See ‘Indian Defence Budget: Fact and Fantasy’, Economic and Political Weekly, April 29, 1989, p. 907.

    Google Scholar 

  92. See James Clad, ‘Power amid Poverty’, Far Eastern Econonic Review, 7 June 1990, pp. 47–51 and R.G. Matthews, ‘The Development of India’s Defence-Industrial Base’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 12, December, 1989, No. 4, pp. 405–29.

    Google Scholar 

  93. For example, statement of Minister of State for Defence Ramanna, as in Clad, Ibid., p. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  94. Interestingly, the growth in the private sector continues apace, notwithstanding the problems relating to macroeconomic management and the performance of the public sector. See ‘Bulls on the Rampage’, India Today, 15 August, 1990, pp. 93–4 and ‘The Stock Market Boom’, Frontline, 18–31 August, 1990, p. 109.

    Google Scholar 

  95. See Hormuz P. Mama, ‘India’s New Tactical Missiles’, International Defence Review, No. 7, 1989, pp. 963–4.

    Google Scholar 

  96. In the defence industries, India is already developing an interesting relationship with the US. Former Defence Minister Pant, during a visit to the US in 1989, showed interest in acquiring a number of technologies in relation to India’s Light Combat Aircraft project. The project will involve extensive US assistance in the areas of avionics and engine design. The US reportedly reacted positively to Pant’s request for assistance with high-strength fibre technology. It also reportedly reacted positively to his request for sophisticated underwater technology and a number of other technologies. See Sandananda Mukherjee in Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 October, 1989, p. 912. See also Mohammed Ayoob, ‘India in South Asia: the Quest for Regional Predominance’, in World Policy Journal, Vol. VII, Winter, 1989–90, No. l, p. 113

    Google Scholar 

  97. Many Indians who migrate to the US retain close links with India. Many more receive their advanced education in the US and then return to India. Such links are of considerable value in the development of India’s more sophisticated technologies. For example, Abdul Kalam, who was in charge of the Agni rocket program, and five other scientists spent some time studying at NASA. See an article by John Fialka in the Wall Street Journal, 6 July, 1989. An example of the significance of this type of interchange may be seen in the report of the National Science Foundation, Indian Scientific Strengths: Selected Opportunities for IndoUS Cooperation, Washington DC, 1987. The report advocated closer links in a number of important areas in science and technology. Its members included a number of US Indians prominent in scientific and business circles. There are currently over 400,000 skilled Indians living abroad. Of these, 20% are highly skilled scientists. Reported in a recent study of the Centre for Planning Research and Action, New Delhi.

    Google Scholar 

  98. The heart of the Indian Air Force is comprised of MiG 2ls and MiG 29s These aircraft are still being manufactured under licence from the Soviet Union, with Soviet assistance. Similarly, the Indian Navy is still acquiring Soviet Kilo class submarines, which will constitute the bulk of the Indian submarine force. A high level Indo-Soviet joint defence group recently undertook a comprehensive review of the security environment in the region and decided on steps further to expand cooperation in the field of defence. Source - Pacific Defence Reporter, May, 1990, p. 31.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Ross Babbage Sandy Gordon

Copyright information

© 1992 Ross Babbage and Sandy Gordon

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gordon, S. (1992). Domestic Foundations of India’s Security Policy. In: Babbage, R., Gordon, S. (eds) India’s Strategic Future. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21885-1_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics