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Stalin as Hitler’s Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet Threat

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Book cover Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62

Part of the book series: St Antony’s/Macmillan Series ((STANTS))

Abstract

To understand the basic rationale underlying the Western defence organisations one has to focus on the prime reason Western decisionmakers had to form these alliances, and later, to give the North Atlantic Treaty the military striking power of an integrated organisation. This reason was the Western perception of a Soviet threat. If we want to say anything about the justification and purpose of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), it is advisable to start by examining the Western idea of this threat, asking how it originated, and whether it was realistic. Once we have identified the roots of this threat-perception, we will have found conditions which have to be fulfilled if the Western security systems are ever to lose their raison d’être.

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Notes

  1. Gavriel Ra’anan, International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional ‘Debate’ during the Zhdanovshchina, Hamden, Ct., Archon Books, Shoe String Press, 1983.

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  2. Cf. Beatrice Heuser, Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–1953, London and New York, Routledge, 1989, pp. 18–42, 143-8, and see below.

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© 1992 Beatrice Heuser

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Heuser, B. (1992). Stalin as Hitler’s Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet Threat. In: Heuser, B., O’Neill, R. (eds) Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62. St Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21810-3_2

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