Brzezinski and the Adversaries: the USSR and the PRC

Abstract

Brzezinski’s appointment led many to believe that the Carter Administration would focus less on the USSR and the PRC and more on trilateral cooperation, the Third World, nuclear non-proliferation, and the moral dimension of foreign policy. This belief rested on Brzezinski’s criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy for its excessive preoccupation with relations with adversaries, for its neglect of US relations with allies, and for its indifference to the less-developed countries and to moral imperatives and on Carter’s reiteration of those criticisms during the campaign. But soon it became evident that Carter’s national security policy was dominated by internal conflicts over its focus and, eventually, despite the campaign pledges, with America’s Communist adversaries — the USSR and the PRC. Moreover, it appeared that normalization of US-PRC relations, US-Soviet relations, trilateral cooperation, and US-Third World relations were simply a series of badly executed improvisations that lacked an overall strategic conception. This chapter examines Brzezinski’s impact on US policy toward the PRC and the USSR by analyzing the consistency between his operational code beliefs and his policy preferences and/or actions as it manifested itself in the rationale of policies in his memorandums to Carter, in official statements, in his approach to issues, and in his initiatives toward the PRC and the USSR.