Brzezinski Organizing Power for Decision-Making

Abstract

The appointment of Brzezinski as National Security Adviser, unlike Kissinger’s, was not totally unexpected for two reasons: (a) Brzezinski and Jimmy Carter, unlike Nixon and Kissinger, were personally close since 1973 when Carter joined the Trilateral Commission which Brzezinski directed; and (b) by the end of 1975 Brzezinski emerged as Carter’s principal foreign policy adviser.¹ In announcing Brzezinski’s appointment Carter described him as “the key adviser for me” in international affairs while admitting that “I’ve been an eager student in the last two or three years.”² This chapter examines Carter’s beliefs regarding world politics and strategy and tactics for achieving national goals and their congruence with those of Brzezinski, the definitions of their roles by the principal policymakers, and the impact of these on the organization of the formal and informal policymaking structures which could have affected the consistency between Brzezinski’s beliefs and his recommendations and/or actions while in office. In addition, it examines whether these structures reflected any of Brzezinski’s beliefs, and notes the similarities and differences with the structures established by Nixon and Kissinger.