Conclusions

Abstract

British policy towards Greece during the wartime period was based on three factors: the value of the country as a centre of resistance to the Germans; the implied promise to restore the King and his Government; and the danger of the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime after liberation. In the early years, the military authorities placed great emphasis on the importance of sabotage and intelligence operations within Greece, believing these to outweigh the political factors the Foreign Office was stressing. As a result of the decision at Quebec not to engage in major operations in the Balkans, it was evident that Greece would not become a battleground. It also appeared that EAM’s probable actions might require the use of major numbers of British troops needed elsewhere, unless Greek political problems were solved prior to the day of liberation. From then on, the military commanders in Mediterranean, as well as the Chiefs of Staff, supported the efforts of the Foreign Office, often in opposition to the views of Churchill.