Hick against Himself: His Theodicy versus his Replica Theory

Abstract

John Hick’s replica theory of the afterlife was first proposed in response to the verification challenge to religious language.¹ Since then, it has been put to rest and resuscitated several times.² Issues from the validity of eschatological verification to the importance of embodiment in the post-mortem state have been involved. Hick himself shifted the context of a replicative or reconstitutive afterlife from verification to the nature of life beyond death. Intermediate in that shift was his development of an Irenaean theodicy, of which his personal eschatology is part and parcel.³ What I propose to show is that consideration of Hick’s theodicy can provide a fresh perspective on the debate over the replica theory. Specifically, I argue that Hick’s replica theory undermines his Irenaean theodicy. Conversely, if one affirms an Irenaean theodicy, one has further reason to reject the replica theory. This conclusion, furthermore, offers intriguing implications for other important issues involved in personal eschatology, such as continuity and dualism. I shall therefore first sketch out Hick’s Irenaean theodicy and replica theory, then deal with the tension between the two.