This study equates the concept of an organic security order with a specifically European security order. After World War II Winston Churchill was of the opinion that Europe should restore itself as a political “world region.” Such a restoration was necessary to create a more stable world order based on “regional pillars,” with a “unified Europe” as one of those geographically organic pillars.1 Churchill’s hope concurred with the views of, among others, George F. Kennan, who in his capacity as one of the chief planners of the postwar foreign policy of the United States advocated a strategy of a federated Europe “into which the several parts of Germany could be absorbed.”2 Unfortunately, none of these plans was ever realized. Instead, a divided Europe emerged and the military alliances became the symbol of this failure.
KeywordsEurope Arena Defend Stake Romania
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