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Agnosticism and the Atheistic Argument from Suffering

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Moral Scepticism
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3.1 A very familiar argument against the existence of a supremely perfect being can be put as follows. Such a being would be omnipotent and, hence, would have the power to prevent suffering; and he would also be perfectly morally good and so would want to do so. It follows that there is no being who combines omnipotence and perfect moral goodness and, hence, that God does not exist. If this argument (call it A) is sound, then, since its conclusion contradicts the conclusion of O, the latter must be unsound; and, of course, the converse is true: if O is sound, then A is unsound.

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© 1991 Clement Dore

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Dore, C. (1991). Agnosticism and the Atheistic Argument from Suffering. In: Moral Scepticism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21331-3_3

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