Codetermination and Profit-sharing

  • D. M. Nuti
Part of the The New Palgrave book series (NPA)


The contract regulating labour employment by capitalist firms usually embodies three basic elements: a fixed money wage rate per unit of time, the subjection of workers to the employer’s authority in the workplace and the short-term nature of the hiring commitment. Explicit or implicit departures from this standard can be observed; they are the result of individual or collective negotiations in the labour market, which balance out their advantages and disadvantages for each party, either directly or through accompanying changes in other parameters of the labour contract. Government legislation and economic policy set limits or fix actual values for some of these parameters and stipulations; within these bounds the market determines the rest.


Labour Productivity Excess Demand Full Employment Marginal Revenue Employee Participation 
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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1991

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  • D. M. Nuti

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