Abstract
The contract regulating labour employment by capitalist firms usually embodies three basic elements: a fixed money wage rate per unit of time, the subjection of workers to the employer’s authority in the workplace and the short-term nature of the hiring commitment. Explicit or implicit departures from this standard can be observed; they are the result of individual or collective negotiations in the labour market, which balance out their advantages and disadvantages for each party, either directly or through accompanying changes in other parameters of the labour contract. Government legislation and economic policy set limits or fix actual values for some of these parameters and stipulations; within these bounds the market determines the rest.
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© 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Nuti, D.M. (1991). Codetermination and Profit-sharing. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) The World of Economics. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21315-3_10
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