Abstract
When Kant attempts to give some kind of definition of respect it is striking that he draws his bearings through relating himself to legal thought on the one hand and Christian ideas on the other. These different comparisons are brought together in his sense of respect as a negative duty:
The duty of free respect to others, since it is actually only negative (Not to exalt oneself over others) and is thus analogous to the juridical duty (Not to encroach upon their rights), can, although it is merely a duty of virtue, be regarded as a strict duty in comparison with the broad duty to love one’s fellow men. (The Doctrine of Virtue, Section 25, p. 448)1
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© 1991 Victor J. Seidler
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Seidler, V.J. (1991). Respect and Love. In: The Moral Limits of Modernity. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21296-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21296-5_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-21298-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-21296-5
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