Abstract
The metmorphosis of China in the last few decades of its imperial history was both momentous and sweeping. Seventy years after the impact of European expansion was first seriously felt, the Middle Kingdom — a universal empire — was replaced by a nation-state, the first republic in Asia. This signified the total collapse of the traditional Chinese world order which had to give way to the European-defined international order of modern times. In the confrontation of the two civilizations, the Chinese civilization, of which China had been so proud, had to adapt itself and adopt some Western institutions such as, for example, those elaborated in international law for the conduct of relations between modern states. It was a gradual and sometimes painful process to transform the old Confucian Empire so as to be accepted by the European international system. In this way, China, half reluctantly and half willingly, was put into the framework of the European international system.
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Notes and References
Fitzgerald, C. P., Revolution in China, p. 201.
One good illustration was the division of China into spheres of influence. According to Sun Yat-sen, at the time of World War I, the Russian sphere of influence in China constituted 42 per cent of the Chinese territory; the British, 28 per cent, the French and the Japanese, each over 5 per cent; and Germany, 1 per cent. See Ch’i, M., China Diplomacy 1914–1918, p. 122.
Millard to Bonsal, Nov. 4, 1913, in Bonsal Papers, Box 5.
For China’s war-time diplomacy, see Ch’i, China Diplomacy.
President Xu Shichang to King George V, Nov. 13, 1918, Chinese Archives (hereafter, CA) 1039-2. Dispatches of the same content in English were sent to Wilson and the Emperor of Japan at the same time.
Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China, p. 324. The Chinese Government actually pronounced a special three-day national holiday to celebrate the victory of the Allies.
Ibid., p. 323. This is more significant if we remember that barely twenty years before, during the Boxer Rebellion, the Powers had to force their way into the Imperial Palace to compel the recognition by China of their conditions and rights in their relations with China. Now they were invited as guests to celebrate the victory of a common cause.
North China Herald (hereafter, NCH) Dec. 7, 1918, vol. CXXIX, p. 749.
NCH, Nov. 18, 1918, vol. CXXIX, p. 554.
NCH, Oct. 29, 1918, vol. CXXIX, p. 328.
Xu to Wilson, Oct. 13, 1918; CA 1039–2.
Chen Bao (The Morning Post), Nov. 3, 1918.
Xu to Wilson, Nov. 13, 1918, CA 1039–2. Part of Xu’s telegram sent on the same day to the French President and heads of the states of Belgium, Brazil, Italy and Portugal runs as ‘Ces principes [de la justice et de l’humanité] constitueront la base essentielle de notre prochaine conférence de paix dans laquelle je serai très heureux de voir s’établir une co-operation étroite entre les délégués de nos deux pays.’ Xu to the French President, Nov. 13, 1918, CA 1039-2.
These included (1) suspension of the Boxer Indemnity; (2) raising customs tariff to an effective 5 per cent; (3) financial assistance in the form of loans; and (4) permission for Chinese troops to enter Tianjin. On March 8, 1917, Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, replied on behalf of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Russia that they agreed in principle to accord China those benefits. They also made it clear that details were to be worked out in later negotiations. Cabinet to Zhang Zongxiang, Mar. 8, 1917; Jindaishi Ziliao (Source Materials of Modern Chinese History), vol. 38, p. 33.
Alston to Balfour, Mar. 1, 1917; FO371/45940/10. See also Reinsch to Lansing, Mar. 9, 1917; FRUS, 1917, supp. vol., p. 428.
King George V to President of China, Aug. 5, 1918, CA 1039–2.
Wilson to Feng Guozhang, July 8, 1918, CA 1039–2.
Feng to Wilson, July 11, 1918, CA 1039–2.
See, for example, Yu Xinchun, ‘Bali Hehui Yu Wusi Yundong’ (The Paris Peace Conference and the May Fourth Movement) in Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Studies), no. 1, 1979, pp. 86–8. He claimed that China did not at all prepare itself for the Peace Conference, even as far as the Shandong problem is concerned. See also La Fargue, China and the World War, p. 182.
So far as we can find in the Chinese archives, from early April to mid-July 1918 the Preparatory Committee had 15 meetings. But the minutes of the first and the sixth meeting are missing from the archives now preserved in the Second Archive Library of China in Nanjing. See CA 1039-371-2. Koo also recalled that he was informed that ‘the Ministry was establishing a committee in preparation for the Peace Conference to study the problems China should present to the Peace Conference, using as the basis for their study various reports that I sent’. Interview with Wellington Koo, V-2-8, Koo Papers, Box 1.
The Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Peace Conference, May 10, 1918, CA 1039-371-2.
The Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Peace Conference, June 10, 1918, CA 1039-371-2.
This is what we have found in the Library of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Second Archive Library of China in Nanjing which holds most of the diplomatic archives of the period 1911–1949. There were a number of foreign advisers to the Chinese Government at the time. It is believed that the others also submitted their opinions on China’s position at the peace conference.
He, in particular, observed that, by October, ‘The objects China should aim at in connection with the forthcoming Peace Conference and the post bellum programme have already been studied and discussed by the official and private bodies as well as in the press.’
Printed copies of all five memoranda are still kept in the Library of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The original copies of Willoughby’s and Nagao Ariga’s memoranda have also been located in CA 1039-373-2 and CA 1003–819.
For example, Padoux argued, ‘Pour toutes ces raisons [China did not have ‘une participation directe à la guerre’ and ‘A l’intérieur même de la Chine, la politique de combat contre l’influence allemande et contre le commerce allemand a été menée avec beaucoup moins d’activité, etc., etc.] … de toutes les questions qui se poseront à la conférence des belligérants une seule vous intéresse en elle-même, celle de Tsingtao, sur laquelle des arrangements sont dêjà intervenus’. Willoughby also doubted the wisdom of yielding to temptation of putting all problems related to China’s external relations before the peace conference.
Zhou Wei, ‘Waijiao Jinquce’ (On Developing a Positive Diplomacy) in Bali Hehui Huiqian Zhunbei Cailiao (A Collection of Materials Related to the Preparations for the Paris Peace Conference).
All these memoranda, including Zhou Wei’s, are found in the series Bali Hehui Huiqian Zhunbei Cailiao in the Library of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing. They are printed in pamphlet form. It is very likely that they were printed for limited circulation.
Enclosure in CA 1039-373-2.
Koo to Lu, Oct. 17, 1918, CA 1003–822. See also Interview with Dr. Wellington Koo IV-3-8, in Koo Papers, Box 1.
Chinese Minister to the Secretary of State, Nov. 25, 1918; Koo Papers, Box 1.
For Long’s memorandum of the talk, see FRUS, Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (hereafter, FRUS, PPC), vol. II, pp. 509–10. Long, however, made a confusion of ‘fiscal’ with ‘physical’ independence! For Koo’s memorandum of the talk, see CA 1039-373-2.
It is likely that the Chinese made these proposals with a view to enlisting American sympathy and help which the Chinese believed they would depend on at the peace conference. From what we have read in the Chinese archives, it appears that no other ministers were informed of these proposals. See also Reinsch to Lansing, Nov. 23, 1918; FRUS, PPC, vol. II, pp. 491–2.
Memorandum of an interview with the Third Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Long, Nov. 27, 1918, CA 1039-373-2.
He resigned his premiership in August and was appointed the Supervisor of the War Participation Bureau. He was attending the Cabinet meeting in that capacity.
Cao Rulin, Yisheng Zhi Huiyi (Memoire of Cao Rulin), p. 188.
Jordan to Curzon, Nov. 25, 1918, F0 371/3693. See also Reinsch to Lansing, Nov. 24, 1918, FRUS, PPC, vol. II, p. 507.
Ibid.
NCH, Nov. 29, 1918, vol. CXXIX, p. 504.
Presidential Mandate, Nov. 30, 1918; CA 05-3-16.
China was at the time divided into the North and the South under two governments. The Beijing Government claimed to be the central government with its legitimacy based on the recognition of foreign Powers and on its actual rule of 17 provinces out of 22. The Canton Military Government, however, claimed its legitimacy based on interpretation of the first Constitution of the Republic of China. Its actual control was limited to five provinces in the south and southwest.
Presidential Mandate of Dec. 27, 1918, CA 05-3-16. The North and the South also agreed to end their armed confrontation and to convene a peace conference in Shanghai which was opened in February, 1919.
It was held from 2.15 to 2.30 pm. See Koo’s Memorandum ‘World Peace and the Far East — A Conversation at an Audience with the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, at the White House, Nov. 26, 1918’; Koo Papers, Box 1.
Hu to Cabinet, Dec. 10, 1918; CA 1039-371-2.
Parts of the Memorandum of a Conversation Between Mr. Robert Lansing and Mr. Hu Weide, Mr. Alfred Sze, and Mr. Wellington Koo, Dec. 18, 1918; Koo Papers, Box 1.
Sir Ronald Macleay was the head of the Far East Division of the Foreign Office at the time. He went to Paris as a member of the British Empire Delegation, acting as adviser on the Far Eastern affairs.
For example, he thought that it would be difficult for China to ‘reopen these questions [Shandong and Jiaozhou] on account of its written agreements with Japan’. He ‘did not think the Powers would agree to the immediate withdrawal of the Legation Guards between Beijing and Qinhuangdao’. He stated that ‘the immediate total abolition [of extraterritoriality] was out of the question’. Even on the question of withdrawing the foreign post offices in China, he said that the Chinese ‘post service had certainly done very well, but the Britishers in China held very strong sentiments in regard to their own post offices, so that it might be difficult to get them to agree to immediate withdrawal’. The talk was between the Chinese delegates Koo and Sze and Macleay on Jan. 21, 1919, after their dinner. See Strictly Confidential Memorandum by Alfred Sze, Jan. 22, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Conversation with Colonel E. M. House at Hotel Crillon, Dec. 18, 1918, Koo Papers, Box 1.
See Peaking Leader, Nov. 28, 1915.
Reinsch, American Diplomat, p. 246.
Hu Weide to the Foreign Ministry, Nov. 20, 1918, CA 1003–822.
Reinsch to Lansing, Nov. 18, 1918, FRUS, PPC, vol. I, p. 242.
See Fifield, R. H., Woodrow Wilson and the Far East, p. 189.
NCH, Jan. 23, 1919, vol. CXXX, p. 262
Morris to Lansing, Nov. 13, 1918, FRUS, PPC, vol. I, p. 489.
Zhang to Foreign Ministry, Oct. 12, 1918, CA 1003–822.
Uchida to Makino, Dec. 9, 1918; Kajima, M., The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894–1922, vol. III, pp. 344–7.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Nihon gaikō nempyō nor abini shuyō bunsho (hereafter, gaikō nempyō, Chronology of Japanese Diplomacy 1875–1945 and Important Documents) vol. 1, pp. 478–9. For the English version, see Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, pp. 351–2.
King, W., China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, p. 1.
There were neither Japanese nor American experts attached to the Delegation because there was a strong opposition in China to having any Japanese in its Delegation and because the Americans had declined the Chinese request to include some Americans. See Reinsch to Lansing, Nov. 16, Nov. 20 and Nov. 22, 1918; and Lansing to Reinsch, Nov. 18 and Nov. 25, 1918; FRUS, PPC, vol. I, pp.241–4.
For a complete list of members of the Chinese Delegation, see Directories of the Peace Conference — China, FRUS, PPC, vol. III, pp. 33–5.
The Chinese had believed that they would have three seats at every session. But on Jan. 13 and again on Jan. 17, 1919, just one day before the First Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, they were told that China was to have only two places. See Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 15 & 17, 1919; Miji Lucun (hereafter ML, A Record of Secret Correspondence) pp. 67–8; also Interview with Wellington Koo, V-4-7, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Sze to Balfour, Jan. 14, 1919, FO608/209.
Interview with Wellington Koo, V-4-8, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 17, 1919; ML, p. 67
See Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 24, 1919; ibid., p. 72. China was still able to appoint five plenipotentiaries because of the panel system brought into operation at the sessions of the Peace Conference.
Interview with Koo, V-3-4, Koo Papers, Box 1. The actual date was, however, Jan. 27, not Jan. 26 as Koo remembered.
Memorandum of an Interview with Secretary Robert Lansing, Jan. 27, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 3.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 27, 1919, ML, p. 72
Koo, W., Gu Weijun Huiyi Lu (Memoir of Wellington Koo) p. 184.
Memorandum of an Interview with Secretary Robert Lansing, Jan. 27, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 3.
Minutes of the Council of Ten, Jan. 27, 1919; FRUS, PPC, vol. III, pp. 735–7
Ibid., p. 737. Lansing, when seeing Wang and Koo before the afternoon session, also told them that at the morning session, ‘other Powers wanted to exclude China from presentation, but President Wilson and I insisted on Chinese delegates being present at the discussion’. Memorandum of an Interview with Secretary Robert Lansing, Jan. 27, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 3.
Ibid., pp. 739–40.
Macleay to Muller, Feb. 21, 1919; FO608/209.
Minutes of the Council of Ten, Jan. 27, 1919; FRUS, PPC, vol. III, p. 740.
Lu to President, Jan. 28, 1919, CA 1003–822; see also Memorandum of an Interview with President Wilson at Murat Mansion, Jan. 27, 1919; Koo Papers, Box 3.
For a summary of Koo’s speech, see Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 30, 1919, ML, pp. 73–4. The English version is from FRUS, PPC, vol. III, pp. 755–6.
See Macleay to Muller, Feb. 21, 1919; FO608/209. In Macleay’s words, ‘Koo presented China’s case in a very able speech.’
Yen to Wu, Jan. 29, 1919, CA 1003–823.
See Koo, Gu Weijum Huiyi Lu, p. 186–7.
NCH, Feb. 2, 1919, vol. CXXX, p. 326.
Ibid.
Matsui was the Japanese Ambassador to France and concurrently one of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference. On Jan. 28, he telegraphed Obata about the Chinese demands at the Council of Ten. Matsui to Obata, Jan. 28, The Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter, JFMA), microfilmed by the Library of Congress, MT 231–22. On Feb. 1, Matsui also telegraphed Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, asking him to urge the Chinese Government to instruct its delegates to be more cooperative with the Japanese at the Peace Conference.
Obata to Matsui, Feb. 1, 1919; ibid., p. 17.
Obata to Uchida, Feb. 13, 1919, NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi kreika gaiyō; and Reinsch to Polk, June 6, 1919, FRUS, 1919, vol. I, p. 333.
Obata to Matsui, Feb. 17, 1919, JFMA, MT 231–22, pp. 63–6.
See for example, report by Reuter correspondent in NCH, Feb. 3, 1919, vol. CXXX, p. 319.
Reinsch to Polk, June 6, 1919; FRUS, 1919, vol. I, p. 333.
NCH, Feb. 3, 1919, vol. CXXX, p. 326.
On Feb. 6, the Cabinet told Lu that he had full power to decide whether or not to submit the secret agreements to the Conference, if asked to. Cabinet to Lu, Feb. 6, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Minute by Macleay, Feb. 17, 1919; FO608/209.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, Feb. 10, 1919; CA 05-3-33.
Minutes of the Council of Ten, Jan. 27, 1919; FRUS, PPC, vol. III, pp. 754–5.
For the exchanged notes, see MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements, vol. II, pp. 1445–6. The Japanese troops had since their occupation of Jiaozhou been stationed along the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway. At the time the exchange of notes was proposed, 2,000 of them were actually quartered outside the leased territory, some as far as 256 miles inland at Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province. On Oct. 1, 1917, a Japanese Imperial Ordinance (no. 175) sanctioned the establishment of civil administration in Jiaozhou. The Japanese Government proceeded then to set up Civil Administration Bureaux in Jiaozhou with branches in three other cities outside the former German leased territory. One branch of the Bureau had even asserted jurisdiction in lawsuits between Chinese citizens and had levied taxes on them. The Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway and the mines were also placed under the control of a Department of Civil Administration under the Railway authorities. The Chinese believed and were apprehensive, not without reason, that the continued presence of the Japanese army in Shandong Province and the new move of the Japanese Government aimed at perpetual occupation of the Province. The exchange of notes on Sept. 24, 1918 was a manoeuvre, the Chinese would argue, to have the Japanese abolish their existing civil administration in Shandong and withdraw their troops to Jiaozhou. See ‘The Claim of China for Direct Restitution to Herself of the Leased Territory of Kiaochao, the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway and Other German Rights in Respect of Shantung Province’, China Year Book, 1919–1920, p. 664.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 30, 1919, CA 1003–822.
Sze to Wu, Feb. 7, 1919, CA 1003–823. Lloyd-George also told the Chinese that Britain was to submit its secret agreement with Japan to the Conference.
This is what Lloyd George said to the Council of Four to justify the agreement. See Notes of a Meeting of Heads of Governments, April 22, 1919; CAB29/37.
See MacMurrary, Treaties and Agreements, vol. II, pp. 1167–9.
Millard, T., Democracy and our Eastern Question, pp. 106–7.
Baker, R., Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement, vol. II, p. 40.
Makino’s secretary visited the Chinese Delegation on the afternoon of Feb. 7 and showed the Chinese the secret agreements to be submitted by the Japanese. They included (1) Japan’s secret agreements of 1917 with Britain, France, Italy and Russia; (2) part of the Sino-Japanese Agreement of 1915 concerning Shandong; (3) the Sino-Japanese Agreement of Sept. 24, 1918 on the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway; and (4) Sino-Japanese agreements on other railways in Manchuria, signed in September 1917. Lu to Foreign Ministry, Feb. 7, 1919, ML, p. 78.
Minutes of the Meetings of the Chinese Delegation at Paris (hereafter, Delegation Minutes), No. 18, CA 05-3-1. According to the minutes, from Jan. 21 to May 28, 1919, the Chinese Delegation had had 75 meetings and two secret sessions.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, CA 05-3-33.
Wilson went back to America on Feb. 14 to enlist home support for his programme for the League of Nations and to take care of his domestic scene. Clemenceau, meanwhile, was wounded in an attempted assassination on Feb. 19 and had to take to his bed for days.
Lu to Cabinet, Feb. 14, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Cabinet to Lu, Jan. 8, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 2.
Delegation Minutes, No. 2, Jan. 22, 1919; CA 05-3-1.
Ibid., No. 4, Jan. 28, 1919. For example, the problem of foreign concessions was entrusted to two counsellors of the Foreign Ministry, Wang and Yan. Sze and Wei, two Chinese plenipotentiaries, would take on the matter of tariff autonomy and the Chinese Minister to Italy, Wang Guangxi, the matter of consular jurisdiction.
Ibid., No. 26, Feb. 26, 1919
Ibid., No. 27 and no. 28, Feb. 27 and Feb. 28, 1919.
Ibid., No. 33, March 3, 1919.
Ibid., No. 61, April 5, 1919 and no. 71, April 12, 1919.
Ibid., No. 67, April 10, 1919.
For example, in Fifleld’s work Woodrow Wilson and the Far East — the Diplomacy of the Shantung Question, probably the most detailed study so far of both Chinese and Japanese diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, he only mentioned in passing the Chinese presentation of the proposals.
During the Washington Conference, agreements were reached between China and the Powers on revision of Chinese tariff, eventual abrogation of consular jurisdiction in China, withdrawal of foreign post offices, and withdrawal of foreign troops from China. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China 1919–1929, pp. 80–100.
Questions for Readjustment, ‘Introduction’, April, 1919; CA 05-3-32.
Ibid., ‘Renunciation of the Spheres of Influence or Interest’.
Ibid., ‘Withdrawal of Foreign Troops and Police’.
Ibid., ‘Withdrawal of Foreign Post Offices and Agencies for Wireless and Telegraphic Communications’.
Ibid., ‘Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction’.
Ibid., ‘Restoration of Foreign Concessions and Settlements’.
Ibid.,’Tariff Autonomy’.
Ibid., ‘Conclusion’.
These were the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Commercial Code, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Questions for Readjustment, ‘Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction’, CA 05-3-32.
Likin was a local tax imposed by the local authorities upon goods circulated in the interior of China.
The concessions proposed by China were (1) Any favourable treatment thus arranged must be reciprocal. (2) A differential scale must be established so that luxuries should pay more and raw materials less than necessaries. (3) The basis of the new conventional rate for necessaries must not be less than 12.5% in order to cover the loss of revenue resulting form the abolition of likin as provided for in the commercial treaties of 1902–1903. (4) At the end of a definite period to be fixed by new treaties, China must be at liberty not only to revise the basis of valuation, but also the duty rate itself. Questions for Readjustment, ‘Tariff Autonomy’, CA 05-3-32.
Questions for Readjustment, ‘Conclusion’; CA 05-3-32.
Minute by Macleay, May 13, 1919, FO608/209.
See Lansing to Polk, Feb. 11, 1919, Polk Papers, Box 9. Lansing told Polk that, ‘If there is one predominant ingredient of Paris atmosphere besides fog and dampness it is intrigue. Unless you are here to breathe it, you can have little conception of the schemes which are being hatched by the statesmen of the various nationalities who are assembled here to get all they can for their respective countries.’
Even ‘the great Liberal’ General Smuts, Colonel Bonsal noticed, was talking about ‘more elbow room’ for the British Empire after the peace negotiations. Bonsal Diary, March 1, 1919, Bonsal Papers, Box 18.
‘He [Makino] tells me’, Colonel Bonsal recorded in his diary, ‘that he and Chinda are expecting a rap over the knuckles from Tokyo. “You see,” he explained, “in the days before the Tokugawa Shogun cut our sea-going junks in half and so compelled us to stay at home we also had some overseas colonies along the coast of Siam. Perhaps we are remiss in not insisting upon their redemption”.’ Ibid.
Supplement to Confidential Bulletin no. 57 of the American Delegation, March 5, 1919, White Papers, Box 47.
Memorandum of an Audience with President Wilson, March 24, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 3.
‘An Interview with Colonel House, April 2, 1919’; ‘An Interview with Mr. Lansing at Hotel Crillon, April 4, 1919’; both memos in Koo Papers, Box 3. Koo told Lansing that ‘it appeared to him highly advisable to raise the question before the Council of the Four Chiefs of Government and urge an early settlement’. Koo maintained on both occasions that should China fail to redeem Jiaozhou, it might push China towards Japan, which could not be conducive to the interests of the Occident in China.
‘An Interview with Mr. Lansing at Hotel Crillon, April 4, 1919’, Koo Papers, Box 3.
Koo to Lansing, April 8, 1919, in Koo Papers, Box 3.
Lu to Balfour, April 8, 1919, FO608/209.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, April 5, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Baker, R., Woodrow Wilson, vol. II, p. 1.
Bonsal Diary, March (undated), Bonsal Papers, Box 18.
Private Memo, April 4, 1919, Lansing Papers, MC, AC 15,347, Reel 1.
Bonsal Diary, April 12, 1919, Bonsal Papers, Box 18.
Bliss to Nellie, Dec. 18, 1918, Bliss Papers, Box 244.
Bonsal Diary, April 3, 1919, Bonsal Papers, Box 18.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, vol. III, p. 7.
Lansing noted Wilson’s concessions on his principles and wrote on April 15 in his Private Memo, ‘It is very distressing to see the way that the President’s announced principles are being honeycombed by all sorts of compromises and concessions. It has been done gradually, a little here and a little there, so that I do not think the President has realized what has taken place.’ Private Memorandum, Lansing Papers, MC, AC 15,347, Reel 1.
See FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, pp. 556, 571; It may be noted that the idea of applying the principle of mandate to Jiaozhou was very much alive in the minds of American Commissioners after the Chinese crossed words with the Japanese at the Council of Ten in January. Henry White, in a letter to Senator Lodge on Feb. 10, 1919, stated, ‘I think we shall find that principle [of mandate] exceedingly useful when the claims of Japan come to be considered, which, as you foreshadowed in your memo, include Kiaochow and the Caroline Islands. A mandate to Japan under the League of Nations to administer the islands in question would be very different thing from their annexation to that Empire, and the principle of no annexation will make it less difficult to convey to Japan the idea that China’s lease of Kiaochow to Germany came to an end when those two countries went to war with each other, and consequently that Japan has no claim to that port and its hinterland under that lease, which I have reason to believe is what she is likely to claim. But by termination of the lease, Kiaochow simply reverted to China, or rather China should resume possession thereof in the absence of any valid reason why Japan should annex it.’ White to Lodge, Feb. 10, 1919, White Papers, Box 5.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, April 17 and 18, 1919, CA 05-3-33. Lansing’s proposal was made known to the Chinese delegates by President Wilson on April 17, when four Chinese plenipotentiaries Koo, Wang, Sze and Wei met the President. He told the Chinese that it was, however, only a proposition, not a decision of the Conference.
Minutes of the Council of Five, April 17; FRUS, PPC, vol. IV, p. 556.
Proceedings of the Council of Heads of Governments, April 18, 1919, CAB29/37.
House Diary, April 19, 1919, MC, 40, Reel 4.
Bliss to Nellie, April 19, 1919, Bliss Papers, Box 244.
Proceedings of the Council of Heads of Governments, April 21, CAB29/ 37; See also Mantoux, P. Les délibérations du Couseil des Quatre, pp. 315–7.
See NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, pp. 716–20.
In Mantoux’s notes, it was recorded as follows: ‘Le President Wilson — Les Japonais m’ont dit, avec toute la politesse orientale, que si nous ne leur donnions pas raison sur cet article du traité, ils ne pourraient pas signer le reste’. Mantoux, Délibérations, p. 317.
See NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, pp. 723–36. According to the Japanese minutes, Lloyd George practically showed around Ambassador Greene’s official letter bearing the British pledge to support Japan.
Proceedings of the Council of Heads of Governments, April 22, CAB29/37.
At one stage, he declared to the Japanese that his preoccupation was to maintain ‘Open Door’ in China. See Mantoux, Délibérations, p. 323.
Matsui to Uchida, April 23, 1919, NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, pp. 727–8.
Proceedings of the Council of Heads of Governments, April 22, CAB29/37.
Ibid., April 24, 1919.
A brief glance at the telegrams Lu sent to the Foreign Ministry after April 24 reveals that the Chinese were kept almost entirely out of touch with the development of the matter, for there was obvious lack of information and misinformation in those telegrams.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, April 23, 1919, ML, pp. 133–4.
Memorandum, April 23, 1919, Koo Papers, Box 3. See also Lu to Foreign Ministry, April 24, 1919; ML. p. 134.
Matsui to Uchida, April 27, 1919, NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, pp. 737–40.
Matsui to Uchida, April 28, 1919, NGB, 1919, Book 2, vol. I, pp. 261–3.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, vol. II, pp. 260–1.
Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, pp. 364–5.
NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, p. 748. Wilson also made a proposal, which read: ‘Surrender to China of all rights of sovereignty and retention with regard to the railway and the mines only of the economic rights of the concessionaire; to retain however privilege of establishing a non-exclusive settlement at Tsingtao.’ This the Japanese rejected point-blank.
The actual wording of the Japanese statement was as follows: ‘In reply to the questions by President Wilson, the Japanese Delegates declare as follows: The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao. The owners of the railway will use special police only to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purposes. The police force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway select will be appointed by the Chinese Government.’ Matsui to Uchida, April 28, 1919, NGB, vol. Pari kōwa kaigi, p. 751.
For the text of the three articles, see MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements, vol. II, p. 1488.
Grayson Diary, April 30, 1919, Grayson Papers, Box 3.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, vol. II, p. 266.
House Diary, April 28, 1919; MC, 40, Reel 4
Desktop Diary, April 29, 1919, Lansing Papers, MC, Ac. 15,347, Reel 2.
Grayson Diary, May 5, 1919, Grayson Papers, Box 3.
Sze to Wu, July 6, 1919, CA 1003–821.
See Fifield, R., ‘Japanese Policy Towards the Shantung Question at the Paris Peace Conference’, Journal of Modern History, vol. XXIII, Sept., 1951, pp. 265–72.
Oka, Y., Five Political Leaders of Modern Japan, p. 193. See also Harada, K., Saionji ko to seikyōku, vol. I, pp. 20–1. This is very significant not because Saionji was the head of the Japanese Delegation to the Peace Conference but because of his position as one of the surviving genrō, who had great say in Japan’s foreign policy-making.
See Hara, K., Hara nikki, April 30, 1919, vol. V, p. 88.
Hu Shih, ‘Intellectual China 1919’, Chinese Social and Political Science Review (hereafter, CSPSR), vol. IV, no. 4, Dec. 1919, pp. 346–7.
Schwartz, B., ‘Themes in Intellectual History May Fourth and after’, in CHC, vol. 12, p. 407.
See, for example, Peng Ming, Wusi Yundong (The May Fourth Movement) and Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China.
Koo, Gu Wejun Huiyi Lu, p. 205.
See, for example, ‘Beijing Students’ Petition to President Xu Shichang’ on May 19, 1919, reprinted in Wusi Aiguo Yundong (The May Fourth Patriotic Movement), p. 323.
See Chen, J., The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai, pp. 6–25, and Chow Tse-tsung, Intellectual Revolution, pp. 338–54.
See Hu Shih, ‘Intellectual China’, CSPSR, p. 347.
This view was held by Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party and its first General Secretary. See Chow, Tse-tsung, Intellectual Revolution, pp. 347–8.
See Mao Zedong, ‘The May Fourth Movement’, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. II, pp. 545; ‘On New Democracy’, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. IV, pp. 125–7.
See Meisner, M., ‘Cultural Iconoclasm, Nationalism, and Internationalism in the May Fourth Movement’ in Schwartz, B. (ed.), Reflections on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium, pp. 15–18.
By this I mean the nationalist movement in May and June of 1919, demanding the Chinese Government not to sign the Versailles Treaty without reservations on the Shandong decision by the ‘Big Three’.
Li Dazhao Xuanji, (Selected Works of Li Dazhao) p. 255.
Chow used this phrase to describe what he called the ‘May Fourth Incident’. See Chow Tse-tsung, Intellectual Revolution, pp. 84–100.
It must be pointed out, however, that up to now there have been very few studies of the participation of warlords and some government officials in the populist protest during the May Fourth Movement and their role in influencing the Government’s decision-making in matters of signature. This constitutes an interesting but neglected aspect of the Chinese nationalist assertion during the May Fourth period. The subject will be taken up later in the chapter.
The phrase ‘assertive nationalism’ is used here to designate an assertion by a nation of its own rights as a sovereign entity in the modern international society.
Kohn, H., The Idea of Nationalism, p. 10.
Snyder, L., The New Nationalism, p. 161.
Nehru, J., ‘Nationalism in Asia’, International Journal, vol. I, Winter, 1950–1951, p. 10.
Wright, China in Revolution, p. 8.
For a brief description of Chinese nationalism in action in the two decades before the May Fourth Movement, see Liao, K-S, Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860–1980, ch. 4, pp. 55–80.
Meisner, ‘Cultural Iconoclasm’, in Schwartz, B. (ed.), Reflections, p. 17.
In Wright’s words, ‘The substratum of Chinese society shared the anti-imperialist sentiments of the upper quarters, but they were not likely to be timid if treaty rights and other things of which they knew little got in their way’. Wright, China in Revolution, p. 54
Cabinet to Lu, May 4, 1919, CA 1003–819.
This is another name for Jiaozhou.
‘Waijiao Yaodian’ (Important Telegrams about Foreign Affairs), Gongyan Bao (Journal of Public Opinion) May 8, 1919.
Zhu and Tang to Lu, May 6, 1919, Nanbei Yihe Ziliao (Source Materials about the Peace Conference Between the North and the South in 1919) p. 154.
Quoted in Deng Ye, ‘Bali Hehui Zhongguo Juyue Wenti Yenjiu’ (On China’s Refusal to Sign the Peace Treaty at the Paris Peace Conference), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue (The Chinese Social Sciences), no. 2, 1986, p. 135.
‘Dujun’ was the title of the military governor in a province. They were virtually various kinds of warlords.
See ‘Beiyang Zhengfu Dangan’ (Selected Archival Materials of the Beijing Government), in Wusi Aiguo Yundong Dangan Ziliao (hereafter, WAYDZ — Archival Materials about the May Fourth Patriotic Movement) pp. 320–1.
Deng Ye, ‘Bali Helui’, p. 136.
Dagong Bao (Dagong Daily, Changsha edition), May 18, 1919.
Shen Bao (Shanghai Daily), May 27, 1919
This, as it turned out later, was not a problem. China, by signing the Peace Treaty with Austria, was actually recognized as one of the original members of the League of Nations. The realization of the possibility of China joining the League of Nations by signing the Austrian Peace Treaty helped the Chinese delegates in Paris to make up their minds not to sign without reservations as to the Shandong clauses. See Koo, Gu Weijun Huiyi Lu, p. 205.
For details, see ‘Bali Huiyi Jiaoao Wenti Jiaoshe Jiyao’ (An Outline Account of the Negotiations for the Restoration of Jiaozhou at the Peace Conference), WAYDZ, p. 321.
Lu to Cabinet, May 14, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Deng Ye, ‘Bali Hehui’, p. 135.
Chen Bao (The Morning Post), May 15, 1919.
See ‘Bali Huiyi Jiaoao Wenti Jiaoshe Jiyao’, WAYDZ, pp. 325–7.
Chen Bao, May 15, 1919.
This is a literal translation of the Chinese phrase ‘Liang Hai Qu Qing’. This policy was formulated on the basis that since either to sign or not to sign would do harm to China as a sovereign entity, it would be advisable to choose the less harmful option.
See WAYDZ, pp.325–9.
Wang to Cabinet, May 8, 1919, CA 1003–822.
Cabinet to Lu, May 21, 1919; Zhuang to Foreign Ministry, May 18, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Cabinet to Lu, May 21, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Cabinet to Lu, May 27, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 19, 1919, ML, p. 212.
Lu to Cabinet, May 22, 1919, Ibid., pp. 213–14.
This was later denied by both the two Houses and the two Speakers. See Deng Ye, ‘Bali Hahui’ p. 138.
Dagong Bao, May 31, 1919.
Chen Lu, the Acting Foreign Minister, told Lu on June 16 in a telegram that ‘Duan once sent out to Dujuns and civilian governors a circular telegram advocating the signing of the Treaty and asked for their opinion. The replies received almost unanimously approved [it]’. See Chen to Lu, June 16, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Cabinet to Lu, May 27, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Cabinet to Lu, May 30, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Foreign Ministry to Lu, June 11, 1919, CA 05-3-34.
For details of the crisis in late May and June, see Chow Tse-tsung Intellectual Revolution, pp. 80–170.
Chen Bao, June 12, 1919.
Chen to Lu, May 15, 1919, CA 1003–819.
The caretaker Cabinet was headed by Gong Xingzhan, the Minister of Finance. He was very reluctant to take over. In a circular telegram to the provinces, he actually stated that he would act in the capacity of Premier for ten days only, while the President took time to nominate a new Premier. But, as the crisis dragged on, he had to stay all through the matter of China’s signature, well into July 1919.
See Foreign Ministry to Lu, May 15, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Qin and Sun to Xu, June 20, 1919, CA 1003–819.
See WAYDZ, pp. 353–4.
Chen to Lu, June 16, 1919, CA 05-3-34.
Cabinet to Lu, May 19, 1919, CA 05-3-34.
Deng Ye, ‘Bali Hehui’, p. 142.
See Cabinet to Lu, June 5 and June 10, 1919, CA 1003–819.
Koo, Gu Weijun Huiyi Lu, pp. 206, 209.
Shen Bao, June 26, 1919.
Cabinet to Lu, June 27, 1919, CA 05-3-34. Koo suspected that it was deliberately delayed. See Koo, Gu Weijun Huiyi Lu, p. 210
Ibid., p. 199
As to the Chinese contention that their declaration had terminated all treaties and agreements with Germany, the Japanese argued that ‘Such a treaty differs from a treaty of cession pure and simple only in that it confers for a certain period of time the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, whereas a treaty of cession pure and simple transfers it without any limitation of time. And it is universally recognized that a declaration of war does not abrogate treaties fixing frontiers and the territorial status of the belligerent powers. Moreover, in our particular case, there is no need to appeal to this juridical theory, for, if war abrogates certain treaties between belligerents, never does it abolish treaties between co-belligerents, that is to say, between allies’. See Gallagher, J., America’s Aims and Asia’s Aspirations, pp. 305–6.
Lu to Clemenceau, May 4, 1919, English version in Macmurray, Treaties and Agreements, vol. II, pp. 1494–5, see also Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 6, 1919 for a summary of the protest in Chinese, CA 05-3-33.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 6, 1919. Koo recalled that It had not been unexpected that the final settlement would not be very favourable but it had not even been suspected that it would be as unfavourable as it was actually.’ Interview with Wellington Koo, VI-1-9, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Baker, R., Woodrow Wilson, vol. II, p. 266.
This was what Wei, one of the Chinese delegates, told Lansing the next day. He also said that he had handed to Kirk one copy of that informal memorandum. See Personal Memo, May 1, 1919, Lansing Papers, MC, Ac. 15,327, Reel 4. Millard, an American journalist, who happened to be with the Chinese delegates when Baker went to communicate Wilson’s message, had the same story. He wrote ‘I was present when the President’s explanation of his action in that matter was semi-officially communicated to the Chinese Delegation in Paris, in which the President explained that political exigency (the threat of Japan to bolt the Conference and the private intimation that the British Government might, in that event, have to withdraw, too) had forced him to assent to the Shantung decision in order to save the League of Nations, and that he would see that China will get justice from the League’. Millard to Hill, July 15, 1919, Lansing Papers, vol. 44.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, vol. II, p. 266.
Millard to Hill, July 19, 1919, Lansing Papers, vol. 44.
King, China at the Peace Conference, pp. 25–6.
Bonsal, S., Suitors and Supplicants — The Little Nations at Versailles, p. 239.
House Diary, May 1, 1919, Hist. MSS, Film 40.
Interview with Wellington Koo, VI-1-10, Koo Papers, Box 1.
There is an obvious mistake in the date of the seventy-fourth meeting of the Chinese Delegation in the minutes, copies of which are preserved in both the Chinese archives and the Japanese archives (see next footnote). The date was designated as April 31. It must be May 1, since Baker went to the Chinese Delegation only on the evening of April 30 and April does not have 31 days.
Delegation Minutes, no. 74, April 31 [sic], 1919, CA 05-3-1, also in JFMA, MT 231–4, p. 1568.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 6 and May 8, 1919, ML, pp. 147, 204, see also Lu to Clemenceau, May 6, 1919, FO608/209.
A good illustration of this is Colonel Bonsal’s observation that once on May 9, 1919, Koo told House, ‘If I sign the treaty even under orders I shall not have what you call in New York even a Chinaman’s chance of surviving’. Bonsal Diary, May 9, 1919, Bonsal Papers, Box 18.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 20, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 22, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 26, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
The actual wording of Lu’s letter runs as follows: ‘Pursuant to instructions from my Government, I have the honour, therefore to inform you that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries will sign for the Republic of China the Treaty of Peace with Germany under the reservations made and recorded in the Minutes of the proceedings of the Plenary Session of the Preliminary Peace Conference on May 6, 1919.’ Lu to Clemenceau, May 26, 1919, China Yearbook, 1919–1920, pp. 719–20. In another dispatch on the same day to the Cabinet, Lu reported that the Delegation was making it explicitly clear to the Conference that they would not sign without reservations to see how the Powers would react. They would insist on the reservations until the last moment. Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 26, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Lu and Koo saw Wilson on May 27 and were practically warned that it would be highly inadvisable for the Chinese Delegation to issue any more declarations about the reservations. Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 27, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
He also contended that the Powers could not do any harm to China of their own will consequent to China’s refusal. Germany was now too weak. America, Britain and France could divide China if they so wished and to sign the Treaty could not stop them. Japan had insatiable and unpredictable ambition in China and had to be confronted with the unity of the whole nation which the refusal to sign the Treaty could bring about.
Delegation Minutes, the Secret Meeting, May 28, 1919, CA 05-3-1, also in JFMA, MT 234-1, p. 1459. See also Lu to Foreign Ministry, May 28, 1919, CA 05-3-33, for a summary of the arguments for and against signing the Treaty even without reservations.
Interview with Wellington Koo, VII-1-1, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Interview with Wellington Koo, VII-1-2, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, June 25, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. II, p. 516.
See Notes on a Meeting of the Council of Heads of the Governments, June 25, 1919, CAB29/39.
Wilson actually had his own considerations with regard to the reservation issue. Two days before, on June 23, he informed Tumulty in Washington that he was firmly convinced that ‘the adoption of the treaty by the Senate with reservations would put the United States as clearly out of the concert of nations as a rejection’. Wilson to Tumulty, June 23, 1919, Tumulty Papers, Box 7.
Lu to Foreign Minister, June 25, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, June 26, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
Italics my own.
The matter was decided at the Council of Four on the afternoon of June 26, with Wilson remaining silent on the issue. Clemenceau explained that he had been told by Koo that the Chinese Delegation intended to send in a letter of protest against the Shandong provisions of the Treaty. He went on with a conversation with Lloyd George: M. Clemenceau. — … Faut-il que cette lettre de protestation soit écrite avant ou après la signature du traité? Quant à moi, Je préférerais qu’elle fut écrite après. M. Lloyd George. — Certainement. M. Clemenceau. — Autrement, cela pourrait encourager La Roumanie à en faire autant. M. Lloyd George. — Il faut même se méfier du côté des Allemands. See Mantoux, Délibérations, vol. II, p. 530.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, June 27, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
In fact, the Chinese students and other Chinese people in Paris practically surrounded both the Hotel Lutetia and St. Claude Sanitarium to stop the Chinese delegates from going to sign the Treaty the next day. Interview with Wellington Koo, VII-1-2, Koo Papers, Box 1.
Lu to Foreign Ministry, June 28, 1919, CA 05-3-33, see also Interview with Wellington Koo, VII-1-2, VII-1-3, Koo Papers. Box 1. Lu confessed in his memoir, published in 1943 that ‘Pour la première fois dans ma carrière, je crus de mon devoir de ne pas obéir. Notre pays se devait à lui-même de ne plus consentir à se laisser jouer. Je ne voulais pas, une nouvelle fois, apposer mon nom sous des clauses injustes, et je pris sur moi seul de refuser la signature’. Lu, T. T., Souvenirs set Pensées, p. 82.
The draft of the reservations reads as follows: ‘In proceeding to sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany today, the undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of China, considering as unjust articles 156, 157, and 158 therein which purport to transfer the German rights in the Chinese Province of Shantung to Japan instead of restoring them to China, the rightful sovereign over the territory and a loyal co-partner in the war on the side of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereby declare, in the name and on behalf of their Government, that their signing of the Treaty is not to be understood as precluding China from demanding at a suitable time the reconsideration of the Shantung question, to the end that the injustice to China may be rectified in the interest of permanent peace in the Far East’. China Yearbook, 1919–1920, p. 720.
Interview with Wellington Koo, VII-1-9 and VII-1-10, Koo Papers, Box 1.
By noon, the Chinese Delegation received a formal note from the Secretariat General of the Conference. It stated that ‘The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference has the honour to deliver herewith to His Excellency the Chinese Minister the two notes which he was good enough to deliver this morning. In returning them, it is intended to permit the Chinese Delegates to sign the treaty in the session of this afternoon, if it thinks it ought to do so without any reservation, as was indicated to the Chinese Delegation upon instructions from the Supreme Council’. China Yearbook, 1919–1920, p. 712.
Ibid.
King, China at the Peace Conference, p. 30.
Wang told Hornbeck on June 30 that the Government instruction was received at 5 o’clock in the afternoon, about two hours after the opening of the ceremony of signature. Hornbeck to Kirk, June 30, 1919, Lansing Papers, vol. 44.
Lu to President, June 28, 1919, CA 05-3-33. The English text is from NCH, vol. CXXXII, p. 85.
Reinsch, American Diplomat, p. 332.
At the Peace Conference, China also took part in the work of many commissions. It was elected into the Commission on League of Nations and the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways. Koo and Wang each represented China in the two commissions. When China was elected into the Economic Commission in March, Sze was appointed the Chinese representative. Foreign Minister Lu himself also participated in the work of the Commission on International Labour Legislation. See Lu to Foreign Ministry, Jan. 27, March 14, & April 12, ML, pp. 71, 108, 125.
Toynbee, A., The World after the Peace Conference, p. 25.
See Lu to Cabinet, June 28, 1919, CA 05-3-33.
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Yongjin, Z. (1991). A Disappointed Nation at Paris, 1919. In: China in the International System, 1918–20. St Antony’s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21238-5_3
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