The Non-Existence of Probabilistic Inductive Support

  • Karl R. Popper

Abstract

Using a minimum of propositional logic and of the elementary calculus of probability (see the Appendix), David Miller and I (Popper and Miller, 1983) published a very short paper in which we proved that probabilistic support in the sense of the calculus of probability can never be inductive support. As some knowledgeable people remained unconvinced, I am here restating our case, adding some further proofs.

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References

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Copyright information

© Karl R. Popper 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karl R. Popper

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