Causal and Temporal Asymmetry

Abstract

It is a commonplace that Hume’s analysis of the causal relation in terms of the constant conjunction of the relata makes it a symmetrical relation. To introduce the asymmetry, he had to stipulate that causes precede their effects. In so doing he begged the question against simultaneous and backwards causation. This, I think, is an undesirable consequence, for although we saw in the previous chapter that there are no actual cases of simultaneous causation, this is not just a trivial truth. The question that concerns me in this chapter is: however undesirable Hume’s stipulation of temporal priority is, can any account of causal priority avoid it? If not, then a causal theory of change is a less attractive possibility than at first it seemed. For the hope was that, in defining change in terms of causation, such an account would have as a non-trivial consequence the result that time is the dimension of change. Such a hope is dashed if Hume’s stipulation is inevitable.