Fundamental Contradictions in Binet’ s Theory

Abstract

It is a common theme of contemporary IQ criticism that Binet’s empirical scale, intended as an aid to the clinical diagnosis of mental level for educational purposes, was appropriated by psychologists driven by darker concerns. Critics allege that Binet’s successors introduced a pseudo-precision to mental measurement in the IQ ratio, ignored the need for clinical interpretation by their production of group tests, popularised the belief that observed intellectual differences were a largely unalterable reflection of genetic endowment, and used this entire theoretical apparatus to bolster their belief in race and class superiority. This story has become so influential that even internal histories of psychometry, for example, Tyler (1976) are beginning to incorporate its themes in some form. With the passage of two or three generations it is not difficult to confront the questionable prejudices of otherwise respected pioneers. Their fundamental theoretical and technical contribution can be separated from their personal opinions which can be situated in the context of a time long past. But this process of historical revision is not without certain risks. To make Binet the wronged hero of mental measurement is particularly unhelpful and obscures the real contribution Binet made to IQ theory. The truth is that Binet, more deliberately, more knowingly than anyone else, constructed and popularised the core theses of conventional IQ theory.