Abstract
I opened this book with the question: what is it to recognise the reality of another human being — to recognise them as a human being? In having this question at its centre my approach contrasts sharply, in at least two ways, with philosophical discussions which take as their fundamental question ‘What is a person?’ First, my choice of the term ‘human being’ is, of course, closely tied up with the central importance which my discussion gives to the human bodily form. While that point will play an important part in this chapter I want, for the moment, to highlight the other obvious contrast: that between the form of the two questions. (It will make my discussion of this point easier if, for the moment, I use the terms ‘person’ and ‘human being’ fairly interchangeably: that is to say, roughly as we normally use them.)
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Notes and References
For a discussion of this tendency in moral philosophy, and one which contains a nice sense of the ludicrousness of much contemporary moral philosophy, see W. Gass, ‘The Case of the Obliging Stranger’, Philosophical Review 66 (1957). Gass’s concerns in that paper are, indeed, very close to mine in this section.
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© 1990 David Cockburn
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Cockburn, D. (1990). Human Beings and Homo Sapiens. In: Other Human Beings. Swansea Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21138-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21138-8_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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