Abstract
In Chapter 9 I suggested that there was a fundamental and crucially important distinction between ‘loving’ a particular set of psychological characteristics and loving a person. The emphasis of my discussion there was on the fact that to the extent that I am committed to an individual my commitment will survive changes in his characteristics. The other side of this, on which I touched briefly, is the fact that in so far as I am committed to an individual I do not think of him or her as a type; what is crucial to my thought about the other is not, or not simply, the fact that he or she satisfies a certain description which another person could, in principle, satisfy. There is an idea of irreplaceability which is central to the love of a particular individual.
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© 1990 David Cockburn
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Cockburn, D. (1990). The Irreplaceability of Persons. In: Other Human Beings. Swansea Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21138-8_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21138-8_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-21140-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-21138-8
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