Introduction

Abstract

The concept of freedom has attracted more attention than any other concept in the history of political thought. This is because of its popularity and its ambiguity. Its popularity is obvious; from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, politicians, religious leaders and philosophers have vied with one another to yoke liberty firmly to their particular banner, creed or cause. It is an all too familiar fact that political parties everywhere in the modern world claim that one of their principal objectives is freedom. Moreover, outside the constitutional arena we frequently encounter references to ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘liberation movements’, testifying to the ‘degree to which freedom has become the central value of our culture’ (Taylor, [C], 1984, p. 100). Clearly, the reason why so many different political parties and movements choose to use the language of freedom is because the concept of liberty generally evokes favourable images in the mind of the populace. The reason why they are able to present their very different policies in terms of freedom is because the concept of liberty is ambiguous; there are literally hundreds of definitions of freedom, and it is not difficult for a political party to select a definition that fits in closely with its particular policy profile. As a result, a great variety of different programmes are enunciated in the name of freedom.