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Causal Understanding, Narrative and Geographical Synthesis

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The Betweenness of Place

Part of the book series: Critical Human Geography ((CHG))

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Abstract

Paul Ricoeur has characterized the ascription of singular causal connections between events as a transitional mode of explanation between lawful explanation and explanation by emplotment. He argues that singular causal statements mediate the traditional distinction between explanation and understanding, and thus represent the “nexus of all explanation in history.”1 According to Ricoeur, this mediating function helps to explain why the neo-Kantian arguments of Max Weber seem to run “in two different directions: on the one hand in the direction of emplotment, and on the other in the direction of scientific explanation.”2 The arguments of chorologists concerning the study of place and region could be described in a similar fashion.

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Notes

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© 1991 J. Nicholas Entrikin

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Entrikin, J.N. (1991). Causal Understanding, Narrative and Geographical Synthesis. In: The Betweenness of Place. Critical Human Geography. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21086-2_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21086-2_7

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave, London

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