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The Anglo-French Debacle at Suez and its Aftermath (1956–1967)

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Part of the book series: Studies in International Security ((SIS))

Abstract

The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt on 26 July 1956 set off a crisis which erupted three months later in a triple invasion of Egypt. First Israel crossed into the Sinai Desert and headed for the Suez Canal. Then, ostensibly in an effort to safeguard the Canal, but really (and in collaboration with Israel) with the intention of seizing it, came Britain and France. These two powers had long been dominant in the Middle East, but their 1956 adventure was to mark the end of their sway. No sooner had they landed at the northern end of the Canal at Port Said than orders were being issued to cease fire. In this Britain took the lead. The decision was a result of a bitterly divided country, strong opposition to the venture in the Commonwealth and at the UN and, above all, the anger of the United States. This anger was expressed not only in diplomatic terms but also in economic ones, in that heavy American selling was forcing the pound towards devaluation.

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Further Reading

  • Sydney D. Bailey, How Wars End, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

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  • Winston Burdett, Encounter with the Middle East (London: Deutsch, 1970).

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  • E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: Harrap, 1962).

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  • Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson (eds), The Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Vol. VII: U Thant 1965–1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

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  • Alan James, ‘U Thant and His Critics’, The Year Book of World Affairs 1972 (London: Stevens, 1972).

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  • Indar Jit Rikhye, The Sinai Blunder (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH, 1978).

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  • Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

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  • Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjöld (London: Bodley Head, 1972).

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© 1990 International Institute for Strategic Studies

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James, A. (1990). The Anglo-French Debacle at Suez and its Aftermath (1956–1967). In: Peacekeeping in International Politics. Studies in International Security . Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_40

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