Abstract
Despite the support of half a million American troops, and the heavy American bombing of the North, it had become abundantly clear by the end of the 1960s that the South Vietnamese government was unable to destroy the communist insurgency. In effect, therefore, the world’s richest and, on paper, most powerful state was going down to defeat. The new, 1969, administration in the United States drew the obvious conclusion and began to look for a way of extricating itself from this imbroglio. At first, it tried to impose terms on the North and the (rebel) Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in the South. But this approach made no headway, and the agreements which were eventually signed in Paris in January 1973 provided for little more than a cease-fire and an American withdrawal within 60 days.
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David Cox, ‘The International Commission of Control and Supervision in Vietnam, 1973’, in Henry Wiseman (ed.), Peacekeeping (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983).
Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975).
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© 1990 International Institute for Strategic Studies
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James, A. (1990). The United States’ Exit from Vietnam (1973–1975). In: Peacekeeping in International Politics. Studies in International Security . Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_39
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-53932-3
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